- From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2015 15:59:44 -0800
- To: Dave Longley <dlongley@digitalbazaar.com>
- Cc: "msporny@digitalbazaar.com" <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, Web Payments IG <public-webpayments-ig@w3.org>, Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAHOTMV+=Nuq2nKXQQSh71uB76LLSJr3gfQMysaLh=Lbn1tviwQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 3:10 PM, Dave Longley <dlongley@digitalbazaar.com> wrote: > So, here we're talking about an identity credentials ecosystem where > entities (eg: people) can collect verifiable claims about themselves, > aggregate them into digital identities as they see fit, and then > decide to share them as they see fit. > > This is different from an authorization credentials system, for example, > where services want to restrict access to certain resources. Of course, > a verifiable claims technology can be used to provide the identity > and authentication piece for such a system, but it would not directly > provide the authorization or delegation mechanism. > Identity-centric systems are exactly how we wind up with ambient authority and confused deputies, because they cannot model authorization decisions across more than two principals. See: http://waterken.sourceforge.net/aclsdont/current.pdf >> I would cite Macaroons as a system sufficiently flexible and >> expressive enough to cover both cases: >> >> >> http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/41892.pdf >> > > I think Macaroons would be a fantastic technology to explore using as > the authorization piece of the puzzle; as a replacement for OAuth. > > Macaroons are an authorization and authorization-delegation tool. They > do not provide identity or authentication. In fact, they are > intentionally designed to operate at a different layer of abstraction. Third party caveats in Macaroons are amenable to IdPs discharging verification of identities. I would look to Token Binding, Origin Bound Certificates, and Channel-Bound Cookies as modern tooling for identity on the web: http://www.browserauth.net/ These schemes are amenable to either self-signed origin bound certificates autogenerated by the browser, or use with hardware tokens, smartphones, or other e.g. FIDO U2F/UAF compliant devices for creating origin-bound certificates that can be used for channel bound cookies. Using Channel-Bound Cookies + Macaroons contextual caveats for binding a token to an origin-bound certificate, you can use Macaroons as identity credentials, which is particularly compelling for the IdP + third party caveat case. Such a system allows an IdP to discharge an identity via a holder-of-key proof *without* learning whom they're discharging an identity for. This allows for privacy-preserving IdPs, which aren't possible using any of the federated identity systems we employ today. Or you can use Macaroons to bolster OAuth(2) as you describe if you do want a strong connection between an IdP and the site they're authorizing use of an identity for. -- Tony Arcieri
Received on Wednesday, 2 December 2015 00:00:33 UTC