Re: a common understanding of profiles

On 1 July 2015 at 09:35, Henry Story <henry.story@co-operating.systems>
wrote:

>
> > On 28 Jun 2015, at 22:13, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 06/27/2015 09:10 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >> On 26 June 2015 at 23:22, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 06/26/2015 11:17 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >>>> On 26 June 2015 at 22:58, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Again, I think http URIs and using #s to separate humans and
> documents
> >>>>> are in general good ideas and support that in RDF-based systems.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> However, as the WebID+TLS community in the past has been unable or
> >>>>> unwilling to update or change their  authentication protocol in
> response
> >>>>> to noted and kinda well-known security/privacy issues with
> WebID+TLS, so
> >>>>> I'm not sure further discussion is productive on this mailing list.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Regardless of security/privacy issues, as TLS client negotiation is
> >>>>> being dropped in TLS 1.3 due to the triple handshake attack, it's
> pretty
> >>>>> obvious that WebID+TLS should not be used as a general purpose
> >>>>> authentication protocol in the future as browser support for even
> how it
> >>>>> works today will be phased out over time.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Rather, the WebID community I would suggest looking at the TLS Token
> >>>>> Binding discussion, or improving WebID+RSA or the FIDO work.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm happy to write these well-known issues up and send them to the
> WG.
> >>>>> If you doubt these points, you may wish to communicate with the TLS
> WG,
> >>>>> the IETF SAAG, or the W3C WebSec WG to get in touch with folks in
> >>>>> industry and academia who are working on these problems and may have
> >>>>> more time to discuss these issues with you.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Thanks for the offer of writing up the "well known" issues, that
> would be
> >>>> welcome.  I know you have strong views here, so, in general, a write
> up
> >>> or
> >>>> pointers (as above) would be appreciated.
> >>>
> >>> These issues are strangely enough well known in the larger security,
> >>> privacy, and cryptographic research community, which it seems the WebID
> >>> community could use more interaction with. Good luck!
> >>>
> >>> I'll send a doc out if I have time, but the links are below from Ryan
> >>> and Brad.
> >>>
> >>
> >> Harry, please dont say you would be "happy to" do something, unless you
> are
> >> prepared to follow through with it.  If you claim there are well known
> >> issues with something, then you can be expected to be asked what they
> are.
> >> I think it's clear from the conversation above, that you're not up to
> date
> >> with the subject material, in this case.  So soon after being asked by
> >> TimBL not to quote him out of context, you seem to be doing it again.
> >
> > I am not quoting TimBL. I just said I support WebID as http URIs with
> > the use of #s.
> >
> >>
> >> In future, If you provide pointers to back up your opinions, It will be
> >> more productive, and that much easier to take seriously.
> >
> > Did you not see the poiners below from Brad Hill (Facebook) and Ryan
> > Sleevi (Google)?
> >
> > You just have to scroll down. However here they are:
> >
> > https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xg-webid/2011May/0126.html
> >
> >
> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2015Jun/0001.html
> >
> >
> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2015Jun/0003.html
> >
> > It may take me a week or so to write this down, I can't do it overnight
> > nor do I have lots of spare time. Again, all of these points were
> > brought up privately (last time by Nadim from INRIA at the Social Web
> > F2F) and ignored for a long time.
>
> I don't think that he brought anything up at the Social Web conference
> concerning WebID-TLS. Any TLS issues are dealt with by the TLS group
> themselves, so they are not WebID+TLS issues. ( Our spec has a pointer
> to the fix for renegotation RFC5746 , even though it is questionable
> whether it is really something we should be keeping track of )
>

Regarding the 'private' issues brought up during the Social Web F2F.  I
dont think everything was ignored.  For example, this patch was made
immediately:

https://github.com/linkeddata/SoLiD/commit/02b266c4a9d54cd622dc3926ffce575476bf262e

So, Implying the webid community as not engaging or ignoring feedback I
dont think is 100% accurate.  I remember having positive discussions with
Nadim about reusing his libraries in our work.

I do also recall that you (Harry) were the only person at that meeting that
was actually asleep, so maybe some of the things that went on escaped some
of your attention ... :P

Bringing up actual flaws with actual pointers, or filing issues, means it
that much easier to track them.  As a community, we dont always do that
brilliantly, but we try to.

Some issues are addressed quickly, some fall through the net, and just
become less important with time.  Let's try and catch as many as possible.


>
> > That being said, the WebID+TLS community could use the fact that TLS 1.3
> > is dropping support as an opportunity:
>
> yes, we are aware of that. I have pointed to these transformations on this
> mailing list as they appeared. Note that client side certificate are not
> being completely dropped, it is some aspects of TLS renegotiation that are.
> And there are other ways to get the same effects that are being proposed.
> So we won't know until TLS1.3 is finished.
>
> For the moment we have specified what it is possible to do with existing
> deployed standards. It is for tool deployers in other groups to come up
> with
> more interesting things.
>
>  + TLS 1.3 is still in draft form and could take ages to be finalised and
>    to be deplyed.
>
>  + The JavaSCript cryptography APIs are not tied into the browser chrome,
> which means that keys end up lying around on the hard drive in an open
> manner
> and cannot be used to authenticate across web sites. So they are not that
> useful for
> the moment. We are still waiting for the tie into the browser chrome for
> something useful.
>
>
> > The idea of using private key
> > material to authenticate in a decentralized fashion is a *great idea*
> > and everyone agrees (i.e FIDO, WebID+RSA with separate
> > signing/encryption keys, etc.) it makes lots of sense.
>
>  WebID-RSA would be good except that there is no chrome support.
> My guess is that it will work server to server, and we can experiment
> there.
>
> >
> > A redesign that works with privacy and security concerns would be
> > welcomed. However, that would require the WebID community leaving its
> > comfort zone and engaging with the security and privacy community
> > seriously, which could would be very productive for all concerned. I
> > hope you all can actually do that.
>
> As I said, I am trying to follow what is going on. But don't have an
> infinite
> amount of time either. So we work with what actually functions, and if
> there
> are improvements we'll certainly adopt them.
>
> >
> >   cheers,
> >      harry
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Brief links below:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 06/26/2015 10:25 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >>>>>> FYI: I've moved this discussion to public-webid, I hope I can field
> >>> some
> >>>>> of
> >>>>>> the comments / criticisms.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 26 June 2015 at 21:51, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On 06/26/2015 09:22 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 26 June 2015 at 19:25, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On 06/26/2015 05:04 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> On 26 June 2015 at 14:23, Evan Prodromou <evan@e14n.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> On 2015-06-26 07:37 AM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> Regarding the URI above.  It can become slightly problematic
> >>>>>>> attaching
> >>>>>>>>>>>> key value pairs to an HTTP document, also doubling as a
> Person.
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm pretty sure I didn't do that in the example I gave.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Well I thought you were tying (for example) the key "@type" and
> >>> value
> >>>>>>>>>> "Person" to the http doc :
> https://evanprodmorou.example/profile
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>> So, how to get interoperable profiles?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Note this question was explicitly scoped to the Social Interest
> >>> Group,
> >>>>>>>>> as obviously profiles are going to vary alot across systems and
> only
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>> most generic pieces of syntax. So, could we move this discussion
> >>>>> there?
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Thanks, that's good to know.  However I dont think all members
> here
> >>> are
> >>>>>>>> members of the IG (im not for example).  To the extent that a
> common
> >>>>>>>> understanding of profiles is a pre requisite for implementing a
> >>> social
> >>>>>>> api,
> >>>>>>>> it would be good to get that understood.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Anyone can join the IG.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Again, the way to solve this is probably to look at Activity
> >>> Vocabulary
> >>>>>>> carefully first, and then vCard, and then FOAF and see what is
> >>> missing,
> >>>>>>> then pull requests with proposed modified changes/mapping to
> Activity
> >>>>>>> Vocabulary.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Pick a data standard, and a way to find the profiles. Then,
> >>>>> everybody
> >>>>>>>>>>> implements that.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> +1 good to re-use a well-known standard.  Typically, that would
> be
> >>>>> VCard
> >>>>>>>>> (support across most of the ecosystem), which basically merged
> with
> >>> a
> >>>>>>>>> good deal of PortableContacts in VCard 4.0. It's got an XML
> >>>>>>>>> serliazation, it maps to hCard for microformat users, and
> there's a
> >>>>> RDF
> >>>>>>>>> serialization for RDF users (not sure why FOAF didn't closely
> align
> >>>>>>>>> more, but that could fixed).
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> For things that aren't part of core vCard, the IG is empowered to
> >>>>> create
> >>>>>>>>> and maintain vocabularies (published as Interest Group Notes),
> and
> >>> we
> >>>>>>>>> imagined there would be lots of activity and iterations and
> >>>>> maintenance
> >>>>>>>>> of these vocabularies might go beyond the lifetime of the WG. The
> >>> W3C
> >>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>> happy also co-ordinate as needed with schema.org and IETF on
> these
> >>>>>>> issues.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> -1 to vcard, I dont think everyone can be expected to implement
> that,
> >>>>>>> does
> >>>>>>>> anyone here do that so far?
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> In general, I think it's unrealistic to propose "one profile
> standard
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>> rule them all", unless there's a very strong reason to do so --
> but
> >>> if
> >>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> WG wants to go in that direction I would say a stand out
> candidate is
> >>>>>>> WebID
> >>>>>>>> because
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> - It's already a documented spec
> >>>>>>>> - It is already based on standards, and is 5 star linked data
> >>>>>>>> - It is already implemented by SoLiD
> >>>>>>>> - It is already implemented by facebook
> >>>>>>>> - It already has about 1 billion profiles, out there
> >>>>>>>> - It provides a discovery mechanism for feeds, followers, friends
> >>> etc.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Once again, I dont advocate this as being the single choice, I
> would
> >>>>>>> rather
> >>>>>>>> look for common ground for interop.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If by WebID you mean what TimBL means, i.e. identify people using
> >>> URIs,
> >>>>>>> I am sure almost everyone agrees that using URIs is the way to go.
> I
> >>>>>>> think there's wide agreement there. I believe Facebook and most
> sites
> >>>>>>> indeed do that.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If by WebID you mean FOAF, see above re mapping FOAF into vCard 4
> and
> >>>>>>> Activity Vocabulary and seeing what the diff is. Most of the known
> >>> world
> >>>>>>> implements vCard and there are very mature libraries for almost all
> >>>>>>> platforms. Convergence between FOAF/ActivityVocabulary/vCard would
> be
> >>>>>>> great, but should be done in IG. FOAF is not supported natively by
> >>>>>>> Facebook to my knowledge and has very little developer take-up
> outside
> >>>>>>> the RDF community, although Matt Rowe had some excellent export
> tools.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> FOAF is not part of webid, but it is used in the examples.  Do you
> >>> have a
> >>>>>> pointer to the tools you mention?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> http://www.matthew-rowe.com/?q=foaf-generator
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Might not work any more due to bit rot.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Authentication mechanisms such as WebID+TLS is *out of scope* for
> this
> >>>>>>> WG. Even if it was, the necessary cryptographic and security
> expertise
> >>>>>>> is clearly not here as well. WebID+TLS is not implemented by
> Facebook
> >>> or
> >>>>>>> any other user-facing vendors to my knowledge (Facebook
> implements, as
> >>>>>>> is widely known, a variant of OpenID Connect i.e. Facebook Connect
> and
> >>>>>>> my guess will likely support FIDO). People at Facebook, such as
> Brad
> >>>>>>> Hill and chair of the W3C WebAppSec WG, have come out quite
> strongly
> >>>>>>> against WebID+TLS.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Pointer to Brad Hill's comments?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xg-webid/2011May/0126.html
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It's been forwarded before without adequate response or change in
> >>>>> protocol about four years ago :(
> >>>>>
> >>>>> See Ryan Sleevi (Google) in WebCrypto on cleartext/privacy issues:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2015Jun/0001.html
> >>>>>
> >>>>> More datapoints:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2015Jun/0003.html
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> To summarize the well-known arguments about why WebID+TLS is
> >>> considered
> >>>>>>> harmful and thus unlikely to be standardized: From a privacy
> >>> perspective
> >>>>>>> client certificates send personal data (i.e the URI in the SAN for
> >>> their
> >>>>>>> WebID profile) in the cleartext, unlike even usernames and
> passwords
> >>>>>>> over TLS. From a security perspective (see triplehandshake attack)
> >>> there
> >>>>>>> are so many security bugs in client certificate authentication
> that it
> >>>>>>> is being deprecated by the IETF in TLS 1.3.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This comment sounds like flame bait, and is IMHO damaging.  I
> think, in
> >>>>>> general your hostility towards WebID + TLS is not shared by all at
> the
> >>>>>> W3C.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It's not hostility, its requests for corrections so you should
> >>>>> fix/change the protocol. WebID+RSA may make more sense (although you
> >>>>> should use a different signing and privacy key - and you may need
> >>>>> key-wrapping, which has some issues in WebCrypto in terms of attack
> >>>>> surfaces) in the long-run if you want a lightweight key
> authentication
> >>>>> mechanism.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In terms of authentication protocols, for passwords SRP makes a lot
> of
> >>>>> sense, w/o passowords there is also HOBA at the IETF:
> >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7486
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> More than 50% of the population of Estonia use TLS with X.509 to
> vote,
> >>> do
> >>>>>> banking and identify themselves.  The system is now being rolled
> out to
> >>>>>> Finland.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Does this also fail your personal litmus test?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> They do not use TLS client certs or negotiation, they use X.509 certs
> >>>>> transmitted over an already established TLS connection. I've
> discussed
> >>>>> this with them, and they are actively monitoring WebCrypto and FIDO
> as
> >>>>> they plan to upgrade their infrastructure when the newer standards
> are
> >>>>> deployed.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> That being said, the general concepts behind something like
> WebID+TLS
> >>>>>>> (use of proof of key material for authentication) is of interest,
> and
> >>>>>>> should be discussed in the W3C Web Security Interest Group and the
> >>>>>>> Security Area (SAAG) at the IETF for further evolution, rather
> than in
> >>>>>>> this WG. In detail, a privacy-preserving technique known as channel
> >>>>>>> binding (i.e. binding authentication to a TLS channel without
> >>> revealing
> >>>>>>> personal information) is being worked on actively in the TLS Token
> >>>>>>> Binding at the IETF. User-centric authentication with
> >>>>>>> proof-of-possession of key material done using the same-origin
> policy
> >>> is
> >>>>>>> currently being developed by the FIDO Alliance, with the backing of
> >>>>>>> Google, Microsoft, Paypal, and others. I suspect authentication
> >>> without
> >>>>>>> passwords be a solved problem shortly.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> So, let's remain on topic and focus on what is chartered for the
> WG.
> >>>>>>> Thanks!
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>   cheers,
> >>>>>>>      harry
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>   cheers,
> >>>>>>>>>      harry
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> It would be wrong to assume that the point of this working
> group
> >>> is
> >>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>>> make Melvin's site implemented in FOAF with Turtle talk to
> Aaron's
> >>>>>>> site
> >>>>>>>>>>> implemented in HTML with microformats.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> I guess Im not quite seeing it how to implement an interoperable
> >>>>> social
> >>>>>>>>> API
> >>>>>>>>>> without interoperable social profiles.  However, Kingley's reply
> >>>>> seems
> >>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>> make sense. I'll fwd them to the public list.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> We're here for the important goals of defining a social syntax,
> >>> and
> >>>>>>>>> social
> >>>>>>>>>>> API, and a federation protocol for the seven billion people on
> the
> >>>>>>>>> entire
> >>>>>>>>>>> planet -- not to build ad hoc bridges for the few dozen people
> >>>>>>>>>>> participating in this group.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> Ultimately, that means some people here are going to have to
> >>>>>>> compromise,
> >>>>>>>>>>> hold their nose, and implement a data standard that they don't
> >>>>> usually
> >>>>>>>>> use
> >>>>>>>>>>> or like.
> >>>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>> -Evan
>
>