W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webid@w3.org > November 2014

Re: Browser usability of Certificates

From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2014 21:04:32 +0100
Message-ID: <546E4950.6010609@gmail.com>
To: "henry.story@bblfish.net" <henry.story@bblfish.net>, Mo McRoberts <Mo.McRoberts@bbc.co.uk>
CC: "public-webid@w3.org" <public-webid@w3.org>
On 2014-11-20 19:38, henry.story@bblfish.net wrote:
>
>> On 19 Nov 2014, at 15:24, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com <mailto:melvincarvalho@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 19 November 2014 14:33, Mo McRoberts<Mo.McRoberts@bbc.co.uk <mailto:Mo.McRoberts@bbc.co.uk>>wrote:
>>
>>     We use TLS CCA within the BBC for access to production services and tools. Thousands upon thousands of people use them regularly. I'm an issuer for third parties who've signed NDAs to get certs, so I also have to deal with them when they get unstuck. I can tell you absolutely categorically that the CCA user experience *is* universally terrible, especially around cert/key management. I know this not because I'm jumping to conclusions on behalf of end-users, but because I have to support the end-users who are using CCA.
>>
>>
>> Mo, could you drill down into the pain points, in order of what you see as the biggest, e.g. auth UI, keys across devices, lost keys, particular browsers, etc.
>
> +1 that would be very helpful.
> It looks like a big issue you have is due to Certificate Authorities. But once WebID removes that, what problems remain?

My guess is that the problems Mo referred to probably do not have much to do
with CAs, but with the processes involved with issuing and renewing certificates.

Mozillas's keygen was designed almost 20 years ago.  It doesn't support renewals.

HTTPS CCA works fine for the USG since they pay hideous sums per seat to keep
PIV and CAC going.  The users only have one certificate to chose from so
there are no UX issues either.

Voila! Problem solved.  According to Microsoft.


The markets I'm talking about don't use the built-in PKI client since it
works so poor, they roll their own.

Voila! Problem solved.  According to Microsoft.


BTW, I heard that Mozilla recently removed the javascript logout
method since the other vendors didn't want to support it...


Anders
>
>
>>
>> Any thoughts on how we could make it better?
>>
>>
>>     M.
>>
>>     > On  2014-Nov-19, at 13:16, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com <mailto:kidehen@openlinksw.com>> wrote:
>>     >
>>     > On 11/18/14 9:42 PM, Sandro Hawke wrote:
>>     >> On 11/12/2014 01:01 AM, Anders Rundgren wrote:
>>     >>> On 2014-11-12 05:36, Sandro Hawke wrote:
>>     >>>> On 11/10/2014 06:39 AM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>>     >>>>> Just wanted to highlight this interesting work from sandro
>>     >>>>
>>     >>>> Thanks.   I should say the design came out of discussions with Andrei Sambra,
>>     >>> > trying to avoid the problems with poor browser support of client certificates.
>>     >>>
>>     >>> Sandro, that's a very interesting statement since the W3C is just about to launch
>>     >>> a continuation of WebCrypto which indeed may be focused on certificates and browsers!
>>     >>>
>>     >>
>>     >> I'm just speaking for myself as a user and software developer; I'm not involved in that W3C work.  My feeling is the UX is terrible. My understanding is the only people who ever use it are people without a choice, like enterprise employees and university students.  What fraction of consumer websites use client certs for user authentication?   I've never seen one.   I think that's because the UX is so bad.
>>     >>
>>     >>      -- Sandro
>>     >
>>     > Sandro,
>>     >
>>     > If users are clueless about what they are doing, no amount of UX + UI will solve that. This issue isn't just about browser implementations, its about the combined effects of understanding (on the parts of users and app developers), UX, and UI.
>>     >
>>     > Focusing on the "UI/UX is bad" narrative will not fix anything. Which is akin to the "RDF tools are bad" narrative.
>>     >
>>     > Why don't we try a little harder in regards to exploiting the pinhole that TLS CCA offers? We've done that, and had success [1].
>>     >
>>     > Users don't have a major problem with TLS CCA once they understand what's happening. Like many things (in my experience) its developers that are once again jumping to their own conclusions on behalf of end-users.
>>     >
>>     >
>>     > [1]http://youid.openlinksw.com <http://youid.openlinksw.com/>-- Certificate Generator that produces Certs that make TLS CCA interactions easier to understand (New HTML version will soon be released) .
>>     >
>>     > --
>>     > Regards,
>>     >
>>     > Kingsley Idehen
>>     > Founder & CEO
>>     > OpenLink Software
>>     > Company Web:http://www.openlinksw.com <http://www.openlinksw.com/>
>>     > Personal Weblog 1:http://kidehen.blogspot.com <http://kidehen.blogspot.com/>
>>     > Personal Weblog 2:http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
>>     > Twitter Profile:https://twitter.com/kidehen
>>     > Google+ Profile:https://plus.google.com/+KingsleyIdehen/about
>>     > LinkedIn Profile:http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
>>     > Personal WebID:http://kingsley.idehen.net/dataspace/person/kidehen#this
>>     >
>>     >
>>
>>
>>     --
>>     Mo McRoberts - Chief Technical Architect - Archives & Digital Public Space,
>>     Zone 2.12, BBC Scotland, 40 Pacific Quay, Glasgow G51 1DA.
>>
>>     Inside the BBC? My movements this week:http://neva.li/where-is-mo
>
> Social Web Architect
> http://bblfish.net/
>
Received on Thursday, 20 November 2014 20:05:08 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Tuesday, 6 January 2015 20:54:50 UTC