Re: mitigating Webid (+ TLS') single point of failure

On 14 June 2013 02:11, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote:

>  On 6/13/13 7:12 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 14 June 2013 01:05, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote:
>
>>   On 6/13/13 6:57 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 13 June 2013 19:17, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote:
>>
>>>   On 6/13/13 11:02 AM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 June 2013 22:15, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>   On 6/11/13 3:58 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 11 June 2013 21:50, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  On 11 Jun 2013, at 21:47, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11 June 2013 21:39, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  On 11 Jun 2013, at 21:28, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11 June 2013 20:20, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Melvin, you forget that you could also use .onion or .garlic urls if
>>>>>>> you really don't want to rely on DNS.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  As for the rest I think it is interesting. But it seems like a lot
>>>>>>> of work, which will require
>>>>>>> working on a logic of trust, and much more. Perhaps a Phd thesis?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  You really think it's that much work?  OK, then how about this:  we
>>>>>> each take the keys of people in our friends list, and cache the reverse
>>>>>> lookup for them ... ?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  And how do you stop a man in the middle changing all those pieces
>>>>>> of info as you fetch them?
>>>>>> What is the algorith you use for trusting those people? How do you
>>>>>> tell them to update their
>>>>>> system if your keys change? What do I do in case of clash? Etc....
>>>>>> etc....
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I don't think that quick answers to this point on a mailing list
>>>>>> are going to be satisfactory.
>>>>>> You need someone full time on these issues, and careful work with
>>>>>> crypto specialists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I think, as with much of security, there's no perfect answer to
>>>>> these questions.  Tho for each scenario you can devise a strategy.
>>>>>
>>>>>  But the principle here is that the mirrored claims make things
>>>>> incrementally better.  What's wrong with incrementalism?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  Well great. We're all waiting to see your implementation and the
>>>>> spec that goes with it.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Well it only works if people start doing it.  The algorithm is not
>>>> too hard.
>>>>
>>>>  1. For each of your friend's keys, each with digest (d):
>>>>
>>>>  2. On your host add the document
>>>>
>>>>  /.well-known/di/d
>>>>
>>>>  Containing the triple
>>>>
>>>>  di:d
>>>>    cert : identity
>>>>      <webid> .
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  We have to get around /.well-known/ due to its issues with letting
>>>> users have full control, even when they don't control or possess admin
>>>> privileges for a DNS server.
>>>>
>>>> You can handle this by adding a URL parameter to the di: scheme URI.
>>>> Net effect, you can point to the location of the document associated with
>>>> the digest denoted by the di: scheme URI.
>>>>
>>>> We do exactly what I just described in our X.509 cert generation
>>>> services:
>>>>
>>>> 1. http://id.myopenlink.net/certgen
>>>> 2. http://youid.openlinksw.com
>>>>
>>>> Example:
>>>>
>>>> 1. http://id.myopenlink.net/certgen/key/7959 -- public key URI
>>>> 2. http://id.myopenlink.net/c/BVH477 -- page describing the cert
>>>> associated with the public key
>>>> 3. di:sha1;Ufn4rImd6QKET8LqDZwCkRaufLo?hashtag=webid&http=
>>>> id.myopenlink.net -- di: scheme URI with the URL parameter
>>>> 4.
>>>> http://kingsley.idehen.net/about/html/di:sha1;Ufn4rImd6QKET8LqDZwCkRaufLo?hashtag=webid&http=id.myopenlink.net
>>>> 5.
>>>> http://kingsley.idehen.net/about/html/di:sha1;Ufn4rImd6QKET8LqDZwCkRaufLo?hashtag=webid&http=id.myopenlink.net-- back to the original public key description.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  These links are awesome.  How did you generate the string:
>>>
>>> sha1;Ufn4rImd6QKET8LqDZwCkRaufLo
>>>
>>>
>>>  SHA-1 hash function. In our case, its built into the certificate
>>> generator which leverages Virtuoso's in-built layer to crypto stuff.
>>>
>>
>>  So you're taking the SHA-1 of "something".  What is that something?
>>
>>
>>  X.509 certificate, as expressed in the digestURI relation:
>>
>> 1.
>> http://id.myopenlink.net/describe/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fid.myopenlink.net%2Fabout%2Fid%2Fentity%2Fhttp%2Fgraph.facebook.com%2Fkidehen%23cert51F9F8AC899DE902844FC2EA0D9C029116AE7CBA-- certificate description
>>
>> 2. http://www.openlinksw.com/schemas/cert#digestURI -- denotes the
>> relation .
>>
>> 3.
>> http://id.myopenlink.net/describe/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.openlinksw.com%2Fschemas%2Fcert%23digestURI-- page describing the relation .
>>
>
>  Thanks kingsley, so the digest is a hash of the Certificate.
>
> But if I wanted to verify that, how would I do it?
>
>  Dont I need to know the serialization that you used for the digest and
> the canonicalization method?
>
>
> If you have the Cert, hash function, public key, and signature data at
> hand, you can verify the Certificate. Of course, you can do all sorts of
> things by just keeping to the basic rules for digital signature
> verification re. standard PKI (modulo CA network of course).
>

The "concept" that is being hashed is the Cert.

But what is the "string" being hashed?


>
> Kingsley
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Kingsley Idehen	
>> Founder & CEO
>> OpenLink Software
>> Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com
>> Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
>> Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen
>> Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about
>> LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
>
> Regards,
>
> Kingsley Idehen	
> Founder & CEO
> OpenLink Software
> Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com
> Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
> Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen
> Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about
> LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
>
>
>
>

Received on Friday, 14 June 2013 00:16:44 UTC