- From: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 09:36:30 -0400
- To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
- CC: public-webid@w3.org
- Message-ID: <5064565E.1020702@openlinksw.com>
On 9/27/12 7:26 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: >>> So, the point is this: object capabilities are a security mechanism, >>> >>like ACLs. Their purpose is to restrict access to resources to only >>> >>the intended accessors. >> > >> > >> >A security mechanism can be an object capability. > What do you mean by this? There is a relationship between an resource owner entity, a document entity, and an acl rule (another entity) that enables resource access control, which in my world view is a capability. >> > >> > >>> >> >>> >>With URIs, there are two obvious ways to implement this: >>> >> >>> >>1. Make the URIs unguessable - so, I only get access to the resource >>> >>if someone tells me the URI. >> > >> > >> >Yes. Also remember that if privacy is about self-calibration of one's >> >vulnerabilities then the resource publisher is the URI progenitor. These >> >days, URI creation, discovery, and propagation will occur via tweets, sms, >> >blog posts, email etc.. Increasingly, folks with discover URIs >> >serendipitously. >> > >> > >>> >> >>> >>2. Link the URI to a public key - so, I only get access to the >>> >>resource if I can prove I have the corresponding private key. >>> >> >>> >>The problem with 1 is that the nature of URIs makes it hard to keep >>> >>them secret. >> > >> > >> >They should never be secret. Just like keeping email addresses secret is a >> >flaw that reflects folks accepting system deficiency etc.. > Well, if they are not secret, then you do not get the security benefit > and you end up having to use ACLs, which makes you vulnerable to the > confused deputy problem. Only in a totalitarian state. > >>> >>People like to send them in emails and IMs and they leak >>> >>quite easily. >> > >> > >> >See comment above. >> > >> > >>> >> >>> >>The problem with 2 (which, it should be obvious, fits quite neatly >>> >>with WebIDs) is that it requires changes to clients and servers to do >>> >>the key proof. Or maybe not, actually ... I guess it could be done at >>> >>the back end, wherever you do ACL checks, by instead correlating the >>> >>URI and the key presented in the WebID cert. >> > >> >Yes, and that's what those of us showcasing WebID based ACLs are doing. We >> >are leveraging existing technology supported by browsers, email clients >> >etc.. > You are showcasing ACLs, which, as I have said, have not served us > well, and have known problems. Put the letters A-C-L aside, I am demonstrating the ability to constrain access to data based on logic. I don't simply have a list of WebIDs or WebIDs for groups. I have actual query logic at my disposal too re., this capability. Said query logic is webby i.e., it work transitively over the Giant Global Graph (GGG) that is the Web. > -- Regards, Kingsley Idehen Founder & CEO OpenLink Software Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
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Received on Thursday, 27 September 2012 13:37:05 UTC