W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webid@w3.org > October 2012

Re: [saag] Liking Linkability

From: Nathan <nathan@webr3.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2012 10:42:42 +0100
Message-ID: <50851512.9090803@webr3.org>
To: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
CC: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>, Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>, "public-philoweb@w3.org" <public-philoweb@w3.org>, "public-identity@w3.org" <public-identity@w3.org>, "public-privacy@w3.org" <public-privacy@w3.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, "public-webid@w3.org" <public-webid@w3.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>, Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
Kingsley Idehen wrote:
> On 10/21/12 3:52 PM, Nathan wrote:
>> Kingsley Idehen wrote:
>>> On 10/21/12 6:22 AM, Nathan wrote:
>>>> Ben Laurie wrote:
>>>>> I'm getting quite tired of this: the point is, you cannot achieve
>>>>> unlinkability with WebID except by using a different WebIDs. You made
>>>>> the claim that ACLs on resources achieve unlinkability. This is
>>>>> incorrect.
>>>> You're 100% correct here Ben, and I'm unsure why it's so hard to 
>>>> convey!?
>>>> If you use the same identifier for more than one request, subsequent 
>>>> requests can be associated with the first request. An identifier 
>>>> here is any identifying, stable, information - key parts and URIs.
>>>> If the issue is only unlinkability across sites, then you just have 
>>>> a keypair+uri per site. Or better, key-pair only, and that's 
>>>> associated with an identifier for the agent behind the interface.
>>>> You're correct that ACLs won't cut it.
>>> Nathan,
>>> What is the subject of unlinkability ?
>>> I am sure you know that Henry and I are fundamentally referring to 
>>> nebulous real-world entities such as "You" and "I". A composite key 
>>> of: machine name, user agent name, and a document referrer links != 
>>> said neboulus entity. Even further away in today world of multiple 
>>> form factor devices that interact with the Internet and Web.
>>> There is no precise mechanism for electronically nailing down 
>>> nebulous entity "You" and "I". We aren't of the Internet or Web, so 
>>> you can apprehend us in person. At best you can speculate that we are 
>>> the subjects of tokens comprised of composite keys.
>>> Unlinkability is subject to context fluidity and temporality once you 
>>> add neboulus congnitive entites (not of the Web or Internet) to the 
>>> equation. I believe you know this anyway :-)
>> We cannot say that a URI refers to "you" or "I" in one breathe, and 
>> say it doesn't (or may not) in another.
> You raise a good point, Now let me clarify, I don't believe (unless in 
> utter error) that I've ever claimed that a URI definitively refers to 
> "You", "Me", or "I". Of course, I cannot claim to have not made the 
> careless utterances such as "Your Personal URI" , for instance.
> A URI that serves as a WebID has always been a denotation mechanism for 
> a composite key comprised of:
> 1. private key
> 2. public key
> 3. URI that resolves to a profile document that describes a subject via 
> an entity relationship graph.
> The subject of an X.509 certificate is a nebulous entity. This entity is 
> associated with attribute and value pairs that comprise the profile 
> graph imprinted in said certificate. The semantics of an X.509 
> certificate don't change the nature of the certificates subject.
>> There is a use case which provides a technical requirement here, one 
>> which is simply to not use identifiable information between requests 
>> to different origin servers, and sometimes more granular, not using 
>> the same identifiable information between requests to the same server.
>> WebID, just like any auth protocol can be used, it just means using it 
>> on a one time basis, or only for a particular origin.
> WebID is a part of the picture, not the picture in its entirety. I've 
> pretty much tried to encourage others to be careful about conveying the 
> misconception that WebID (solely) resolves the issues at hand. It is 
> just a critical piece of the puzzle, that's it.
> You don't need to have a single WebID. Such a thing fails the most 
> mundane alter ego test re. 'Clarke Kent' and 'Superman' or 'Peter 
> Parker' and 'Spiderman'.
> Privacy is about the aforementioned personas not being comprised, under 
> any circumstances. The fact that DC world entities 'Clark Kent' and 
> 'Superman' used the same Web browser shouldn't comprise the alter ego 
> relationship between these personas.
> Unlinkability is about the alter ego paradox.
>> Personally I feel there are still questions here with WebID, as 
>> currently people use usernames/emails and passwords almost everywhere, 
>> and they can pick different usernames/emails/passwords on every 
>> site/origin. Suppose WebID was to gain 100% adoption overnight, we'd 
>> suddenly be in a position where everybody usually used the same 
>> identifier (rather than usernames and email addresses) and the same 
>> key (rather than multiple passwords) - because we've never been in a 
>> world like that, we don't know the consequences yet.
> See my comments above. Such a system is dead on arrival re. privacy. 
> There have to be multiple WebIDs and the exploitation of logic when 
> dealing with data access policies, and all of this has to occur within 
> specific interaction contexts. For instance, if I want only you to see a 
> document, I could knock up the require security tokens and send them to 
> you via a PKCS#12 file. You open the file then go GET the document in 
> question. Being super paranoid, I would more than likely speak to you 
> via phone about the username and password combo for opening up the 
> PKCS#12 file.
>> Thus, when security and identity experts suggest that we need to 
>> handle unlinkability, or consider that we may often need per origin 
>> WebIDs (or even have that as the default mode), then we may be wise to 
>> say "okay", go away and find our options, then report them back for 
>> consideration and review.
>> It by no means limits WebID, rather it just makes it applicable to a 
>> broader range of use cases.
> We need others (note: expert is utterly subjective to me) interested in 
> these matters to be constructive rather than dismissive. I chime in most 
> of the time because I see Henry going to immense pains to explain 
> matters only to be summarily dismissed in manners that I find 
> cognitively dissonant.
> A basic RDBMS product doesn't depend on single attribute/field primary 
> keys, why would such thinking even apply to the complex matter of 
> privacy. When I use the term composite, I am pretty much referring the 
> the same concept well understood in the RDBMS world. You can have a 
> 'super key' comprised of elements that are of themselves unique 
> identifiers.
> I don't believe in a single WebID neither does Henry. We just believe 
> that Web-scale verifiable identity is a critical part of the required 
> infrastructure. We also believe that a de-referencable URI (e.g., an 
> HTTP URI) is a very powerful vehicle for this endeavor, even more so 
> when combined with structured data and first-order logic.
> I only know of one way to deal with context fluidity at the software 
> level, and that's via logic integrated into data which produces self 
> describing data objects .

I agree on all counts and feel/think the same, so I think I'll need to 
go and re-read this thread and see where the confusion is.

Best, Nathan
Received on Monday, 22 October 2012 09:43:42 UTC

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