- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 09:51:00 -0700
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Cc: "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAEnTvdDDn0e6F8iQMscH+aV0udxFjaKipX_6LAs+2YnYEf3sBA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 9:34 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote: > On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 9:21 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote: > >> > >> > >> On May 6, 2013 9:08 AM, "Mark Watson" <watsonm@netflix.com> wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 6:13 AM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> We'll be meeting today, same time and place as usual: > >> >> > >> >> +1.617.761.6200, 27978# (CRYPT) > >> >> IRC irc.w3.org:6665 #crypto > >> >> 20h GMT > >> >> > >> >> I'm filling in for Virginie writing this agenda - here's my take on > >> >> high > >> >> priority things to discuss, feel free to amend! > >> >> > >> >> 1) Futures examples and integration into editors draft - next public > >> >> working draft? > >> >> > >> >> 2) new use-cases - scheduling folks time with Arun > >> >> > >> >> 3) Key wrap/unwrap integration as "feature at risk" > >> > > >> > > >> > The issue Ryan and I have been discussing is whether there is ever any > >> > security significance to the API boundary (between UA and JS). Or, put > >> > another way, whether there is a reasonable use-case for never > exposing keys > >> > to the JS (in the absence of pre-provisioned keys). > >> > > >> > We've agreed to include key wrap/unwrap as a "feature at risk" > (twice). > >> > I don't think we should revisit the inclusion of that in the next > editor's > >> > draft. > >> > > >> > We do need to discuss the boundary topic, as that is a point of > >> > significant disagreement which might affect what we do with wrap, > unwrap and > >> > other features in future. > >> > >> I think the format bears some discussion - how coupled is it to the > >> security assumptions being made and how separable is JOSE, even with > >> wrap/unwrap being included as at risk. > > > > The format can be decoupled. I think we bottomed that out on the list: > > (1) technically, we could design our own format that would be just as > good > > as JOSE - except that we're starting a lot later than them > > (2) the API could be factored so that the format is determined by the JS, > > but with the same "never expose keys to JS" properties. That design > couldn't > > support the existing JOSE format due to various technicalities (which > could > > potentially be addressed). > > These conclusions certainly come as a surprise to me - and not what I > took away from the other (ongoing) thread. > > I was not proposing we design our own format. Merely explore how much > of the choice for JWE-wrapped JWK was done because it was necessary > and how much was done because it was convenient. Sorry - maybe I worded the conclusion above with a slant that was not intended. What I mean by (1) is just that JWE-wrapped JWK was chosen because it was convenient and had already benefited from some study (in JOSE). > The point of > necessity seems to be tied to the assumptions of security, which is > why I don't think we've really reached a good place at all. > Hmm. Re-check the thread. Apologies if I gave the opposite impression, but I was not arguing necessity for JWE-wrapped JWK. What I did point out was that the existing JWE-wrapped JWK could not be implemented using modified format-agnostic wrap/unwrap primitives, but only due to a number of technicalities, not due to any fundamental design or security reason. The format issue can be decoupled from the bigger question of the security rationalle for wrap/unwrap or more generally hiding keys from the JS. > > >> > >> That said, I feel like were making good progress on list on this, and > >> don't know if its necessary yet to couple it to the call, given the > >> technical subtleties of what we're discussing. > > > > We have a fundamental disagreement about whether hiding keys from the JS > is > > ever useful (absent pre-provisioned keys). I think that bears > discussion. At > > least we should surface that issue to the group in the form to which we > have > > distilled it, since not everyone follows the email threads to their > bitter > > ends ;-) > > Agreed. > > > > > ...Mark > >> > >> > > >> > ...Mark > >> > > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> 3) Next week, optional high-level API meeting > >> >> > >> >> 4) Inviting more review - for example, getting Dan Boneh et al. > >> >> actually > >> >> write down their critiques on mailing list. Dan Boneh offered to > join a > >> >> telecon - shall we aim for the next 2 week? > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > > > > >
Received on Monday, 6 May 2013 16:51:29 UTC