- From: Mountie Lee <mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr>
- Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2012 09:44:25 +0900
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Cc: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>, David Dahl <ddahl@mozilla.com>, arun@mozilla.com, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAE-+aYJSYzxH-bd1JuHNVdCNqjDpj77LFFJ6jN-aTbBXUbqqkA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi. Is there any vulnerabilities by re-produce Ticket? because normally we can expect the time of client side is not match to servers. regards mountie. On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 7:45 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote: > > On Nov 5, 2012 4:58 PM, "Thomas Hardjono" <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote: > > > > > > Thanks Ryan, > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi@google.com] > > > Sent: Monday, November 05, 2012 2:45 PM > > > To: Thomas Hardjono > > > Cc: public-webcrypto@w3.org; ddahl@mozilla.com; Arun Ranganathan > > > Subject: Re: Adding Kerberos use-case > > > > > > On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 11:32 AM, Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, Ryan, Folks, > > > > > > > > I was wondering if it is possible to add a use-case to the Web > > > > Cryptography API draft. > > > > > > > > We want to be able to implement the full Kerberos Client in > > > JavaScript > > > > and make use of the crypto APIs. In particular, we would love to > > have > > > > an additional API to handle Kerberos tickets (eg. fetching/storing > > > > tickets from the underlying OS). > > > > > > We definitely want to capture the use case as a possible user of the > > > API. > > > I leave it to Arun (CC'd) to figure out whether the Use Case doc > > being > > > prepared is meant to describe what things should be possible with > > this > > > API in V1, or what things are meant to be possible (in some yet > > > undetermined future version with all features). > > > > Thanks -- I can provide a paragraph of the use-case if that will help. > > > > > > > Individually, I think an API for handling Kerberos Tickets would be > > an > > > entirely different API and document, with its own set of use cases > > and > > > supporting work. I think showing how it incorporates with the API > > > proposed is good, and it probably would belong in this group - after > > a > > > re-chartering effort (at least, as I understand our current > > charter). > > > > Sure, this would be one possible avenue. > > Do you think this "Kerberos API" work should be done > > in the W3C or elsewhere? (eg. IETF) > > If for JS/WebApps, then W3C is the place to be, and I would suggest that > of WebApps, WebAppSec, and WebCrypto, ours is *probably* where it belongs > (with some degree of rechartering). > > If *totally* high-level API, it *might* sit in WebApps. > > > > > > > > > > > I would prefer not to spend too much energy discussing how that > > should > > > work until we've got the basic API (the editor/wg draft currently > > > called for in the charter), and then work on iterating and expanding > > > that in future versions and future documents. > > > > Agree, I understand that it is imperative to get the > > basic API agreed upon and implemented by browser > > vendors (ie. would be a tremendous progress). > > > > I would definitely be interested expanding the API once > > the basic API is done. I know the current WG charter > > excludes "crypto providers", but some form of extensibility or > > "layering" of a richer set of APIs would be useful > > (e.g. something akin to a JOSE or CMS level of APIs). > > > > We have been calling those high-level APIs, for which there is known and > acknowledged interest in. > > The overlap between the two arguably exists in the Key object. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Maybe something that looks like the KeyStorage interface would be > > > > workable. > > > > > > I've proposed removing the KeyStorage API. > > > > Is the KeyStorage API work to be deferred for later, > > or is it completely abandoned? I'm kind of thinking > > that there is a huge install base of PIV (PIV-I) smartcards > > that could benefit from a KeyStorage API (or similar). > > Then there is also several hundred million PCs out there with TPM > > chips, which (at its dumbest config) becomes a useful place to > > store keys. TPM-signed key pairs may also be useful > > for browsers and servers (SPs). > > > > I can contribute a TPM use-case if you need one :-) > > > > I can provide a few myself, and did at our Face to Face. Its not at all > abandoned, but I think whether you are talking kerberos tickets or certs or > some other container, I think we need a key /discovery/ API. Of which I > made then withdrew a proposal for, and think we would want to revisit > > We need to address key storage as a primary feature, but I am (currently) > arguing in the group that we do not and *should* not address > pre-provisioned or preexisting (not created by and stored by the site) keys > *yet*. > > > > > Thanks. > > > > /thomas/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Mountie Lee PayGate CTO, CISSP Tel : +82 2 2140 2700 E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net ======================================= PayGate Inc. THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
Received on Tuesday, 6 November 2012 00:45:10 UTC