- From: carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org>
- Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 17:15:38 +0200
- To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
- Cc: Eleanor Saitta <ella@dymaxion.org>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>
On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 04:54:59PM +0200, Anders Rundgren wrote: > I guess the problem is that writing secure applications remain difficult. Unless you acknowledge the problem as such and design a new stack from scratch. Look at EthOS, GNUnet, Briar for inspiration. They place security at the routing layer thus avoiding entire classes of typical mistakes by design. WebCrypto is a perpetuation of the broken old design. > The (in)famous "heartblead" bug is is a recent example of that. > Promising secure applications by using secure algorithms would be wrong > because that is only a part of the problem. Heartbleed is a bad example since it is not about security design but about the safety or corruptibility of the open source software maintenance culture. Apples and oranges so to speak. > Packaged solutions may provide solutions for people with limited > knowledge of secure applications. Such packages can be written on > top of APIs such as WebCrypto. No, because the security design failures are below WebCrypto, thus nothing on top of it can be safe by design - it can only happen to work by accident or authority permission. If you want something you may possibly be enabled to build safe things upon, look at the three things I mentioned above. > We must not forget that the banks haven't managed creating secure > credit-card payments on the web although they have had 20 > years to think about it :-) That's because they would have to replace the web. They could do safe credit-card payments over GNUnet within months from now. > Due to the latter no even the "secure" EMV-cards are more secure > than the non-secure dittos when used on the Internet. > > WebCrypto will hopefully spur further innovation in this field! No, because the foundations are corrupt. It is distracting people from the actual problems by creating false hopes. I am the person who in 1997 warned the HTTP-WG that "E-Tag" was going to be a threat to privacy. I've seen enough cows fly to not fall for any nice positivist blue-eyed thinking coming my way. I know I will be ignored, but I also know that you will have to think about what you did the rest of your life. I mean the entire group. You are contributing to the deus ex machina.
Received on Monday, 26 May 2014 15:15:47 UTC