- From: Eleanor Saitta <ella@dymaxion.org>
- Date: Sat, 24 May 2014 12:19:00 +0100
- To: liberationtech <liberationtech@mailman.stanford.edu>, carlo von lynX <lynX@time.to.get.psyced.org>
- CC: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 2014.05.24 09.54, GALINDO Virginie wrote: > Anyway, thanks for taking the time to share your view with us. You > are pointing us to an interesting problem, that we discussed > intensively. We are currently trying to see how to word warning to > developers in the specification to encourage them to understand > the web security big picture. That task is not easy due to the > always-living side of the security/cryptography science. I find this approach a little worrying. While clearly warning developers is obviously preferable to *not* doing so, it's also been shown to be largely insufficient over the past 20-odd years. If the default behavior of a system is unsafe, developers will generally implement that behavior, regardless of what your documentation warns them to do. It would be better for the state of web security to provide a significantly more limited but default safe API. If there is no API, developers needing to solve related issues will roll their own and get it wrong -- the state we have now. If there is a safe API, they're more likely to make architectural choices on the basis of that API, because you've shaped the level of effort from "either way I'm going to have to do everything" to "I can stay within this box that I recognize as being trustable, or I can do all the work myself". Shipping an API that allows developers to be unsafe puts you right back in the position where they can choose to shoot themselves and their users in their respective heads with no extra effort. Every time we see bug classes entirely eliminated at the platform level, we see those bugs mostly go away in the wild. Every time we see "guidance" provided, we see little or no impact in the incidence of those bugs. The web crypto API will be used in life-safety critical code. If you get this wrong, people will die. Enjoy your guidance. E. - -- Ideas are my favorite toys. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) iF4EAREIAAYFAlOAgCQACgkQQwkE2RkM0wpFxgD/QhvqIBmveR+H29P7dV76c9fC GZPvyZtFvSxvaZM++pcA/jftFah8wVbjsUz13A8kWl+Acd/ZSyZZCZQATPQAKJaX =SanX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Received on Monday, 26 May 2014 14:24:10 UTC