- From: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Date: Fri, 29 Mar 2013 10:50:28 -0700
- To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
- Cc: Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>, Mountie Lee <mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.GALINDO@gemalto.com>, Nick Van den Bleeken <Nick.Van.den.Bleeken@inventivegroup.com>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 4:21 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> wrote: > On 2013-03-29 11:55, Aymeric Vitte wrote: >> Maybe I have a too simplistic view of the certificate subject but as I >> see it the API should provide tools to create, manage, store >> certificates and associated keys based on the WebCrypto API, > > As far as I can see _all_is_already_there_ if IndexDB can be used to > hold arbitrary attributes associated with a key including certificates. > > >> then people can build on top of it CMP, EST things if they like and >> if web technics allow it securely, the API should support the "standard" >> enrollment/provisioning procedures (see next sentence). > > They may be able to do that although it would be pretty pointless > since they anyway have to provide JS-based bootstrap code and ASN.1 > encoding/decoding. > > >> Now, as someone else mentionned in another thread, it seems like we have >> to read between the lines to know what everybody want, would be good to >> have clear scenario of what is required from any interested people. > > In particular how they intend to use an API that doesn't support > PIN-code-protected keys which at least in the context of e-banking > and e-government PKIs is the _de-facto_standard_. > > Since none of the browser-vendors have figured out how to do this in > their current web-platforms, this brings up the #1 question: > _What_ is the target audience? > > And then we have the hardware security issues... > > Regards, > Anders > +1 Anders has accurately captured just *some* of the many problems that are intrinsic in *any* certificate proposal. What's also important to note is that many of these issues are directly related to notions of key "provisioning" - which is why I have advocated so ardently against anything more than opaque key handles.
Received on Friday, 29 March 2013 17:50:55 UTC