- From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
- Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 22:19:55 +0500
- To: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
- CC: Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>
On 2013-04-26 21:29, Richard Barnes wrote: > On Apr 26, 2013, at 11:12 AM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> wrote: > >> In addition to the privacy issue of the eID being a super cookie, in >> Sweden the eID certificate contains pii that must not be accessible to >> arbitrary sites. Are we going to ask the user to approve eID keys and >> certificates to be accessed by different origins, should this >> possibility be available for all certificate and keys or is it limited >> to eID keys if yes how are they going to be identified as eID key. >> This is getting closer to my suggestion that we could have a >> certificate attribute for the origins that a key should be available >> to. >> >> Sent from my iPhone > > The above is a good summary of why non-domain-created keys aren't in scope for the current API. > There are too many open questions. IMO, Samuel's suggestion would be a suitable replacement for the current much more limited Web Crypto proposal for addressing pre-provisioned keys. A nice thing is that the exact method for specifying origin can evolve without changing the API. Long-term the "ACL" should be an attribute associated with the key rather than being a part of the key itself like in the Android Wallet. Whats missing is a generic method for getting key attributes such as certificates. Anders > > Managing access to things like eID keys sounds like a good area for some experimentation to happen. > There might be some prior art to draw on from how TLS client certs are managed nowadays, > but I'm not sure that will address everything. > > This is something the PolyCrypt team is hoping to start playing with in the next couple of months… > > --Richard >
Received on Friday, 26 April 2013 17:20:38 UTC