- From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2013 07:36:37 -0400
- To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
- Cc: "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>
On Mon, Apr 1, 2013 at 6:35 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> wrote: > On 2013-04-01 11:55, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > <snip> >> >>> My guess is that the US will remain at its current position regarding >>> strong authentication for consumers, i, e, at the _absolute_bottom_. > >> Client certificates are a good choice for client authentication, but >> they suffer provisioning hardships and a number of UI issues. > > Yes, are these hardships incurable? A good survey is available at http://www2.futureware.at/svn/sourcerer/CAcert/SecureClient.pdf. >> As for cell phones and second factors, that channel was breached in 2011 >> (http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001349.html). > > You will always find people who claim that they can penetrate any security system. > Does this motivate us sticking to static passwords (reused at multiple sites), forever? > EMV-cards are not perfect (it has been proved) but the amount of fraud performed on > the EMV-level are magnitudes lower than on the non EMV-ditto. > > >> A client certificate means the consumer could be applying his/her >> secret for an insecure/unknown server. > > Yes, I can surely login to "BadBank" with "GoodBank"'s client-certificate. > Fortunately for me "BadBank" doesn't have my money and they cannot reuse the > login information to "GoodBank" either. > > >> It seems to me if the consumer >> uses a non-hardened PKI with internet profiles, then all consumers >> suffer - both US and abroad. Surely you have not forgotten the Dutch >> CA Diginotar's failure affected all users, and Iranian users in >> particular. > > As I see it, a working client-side PKI would be an important part of the > puzzle making the Internet more secure since attacks on public SSL PKIs > would become less useful. > > That is, there's no single solution that "does it all" but there are > some pretty well identified areas worth improving. Sections 3.2.1 Transaction Based Applications and 3.2.2 Non-Transaction Based Applications of http://www2.futureware.at/svn/sourcerer/CAcert/SecureClient.pdf seem very relevant for banking. Jeff
Received on Monday, 1 April 2013 11:37:10 UTC