- From: Arthur D. Edelstein <arthuredelstein@gmail.com>
- Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 04:34:19 -0700
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- Cc: public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org
Received on Wednesday, 31 October 2012 11:34:46 UTC
Hi Ryan, Thanks for the reply. Sorry for not being clear. By "correct and honest" I meant code that doesn't leak data (through malice or incompetence) to parties that aren't supposed to have it. I don't think Content-Security-Policy protects either the users or the web app providers from leaky code. Users can be attacked by leaky JS code running in the user agent (CSP doesn't guarantee to the user that the web app isn't delivering JS code from the one of the permitted hosts to steal user data, a la Hushmail). Users will need to trust the web app to properly secure their data, which is the status quo. Web app providers are also threatened by a leaky implementation of the Crypto API in a web client (for example, a bot with a bad RNG or key generator). So providers will prefer to use server side key generators, etc. As far as I can tell, neither side can trust the cryptographic results, because neither side has control of both the Crypto API implementation and the code that is using it. So I feel that this standard doesn't provide any new security guarantees, either to the user or the web app provider. I am missing something? Thanks again. Best regards, Arthur
Received on Wednesday, 31 October 2012 11:34:46 UTC