[webauthn] Closed Pull Request: Resolve conflicts between spk (#1957) and PR #1970

emlun has just closed emlun's pull request 1996 for https://github.com/w3c/webauthn:

== Resolve conflicts between spk (#1957) and PR #1970 ==
PR #1970 made `[=AAGUID=]` autolinks ambiguous, requiring them to be disamgiguated as either `[=AAGUID=]` or `[=authData/attestedCredentialData/aaguid=]`. This PR resolves the conflicts with PR #1957 caused by this.

Conflicts:

```diff
diff --git a/index.bs b/index.bs
index 2ea7e3d..966772e 100644
--- a/index.bs
+++ b/index.bs
@@ -7356,9 +7356,17 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
 
     1. [=map/For each=] |scope| in |scopes|:
 
+<<<<<<< HEAD
         1. If a supplemental key with scope |scope| does not already exist for this {[=public key credential source/id|Credential ID=], [=public key credential source/rpId|RP ID=], [=public key credential source/rpId|userHandle=]} tuple on the [=authenticator=], create it using the same public key algorithm as that used by the [=user credential=]'s [=credential key pair=], otherwise locate the existing supplemental key.
 
         1. Let |attFormat| be the chosen [=attestation statement format=], and |attAaguid| be a 16-byte value, based on the value of {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestation}} in the extension input:
+=======
+            : indirect, direct
+            :: |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsDevicePublicKeyInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the [=authenticator's=] [=/AAGUID=]. (Since the [=hardware-bound device key pair=] is specific to a particular authenticator, its attestation can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although they do not have to be. This is in contrast to the associated [=user credential=]'s attestation, if it is a [=multi-device credential=].)
+
+            : enterprise
+            :: The [=[RP]=] wants to receive an [=attestation statement=] that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. [=Authenticators=] MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested [=RP ID=]. If <i>not</i> permitted, then |attFormat| is "none" and |attAaguid| is 16 zero bytes. Otherwise |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsDevicePublicKeyInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the [=authenticator's=] [=/AAGUID=]. (Again, since the [=hardware-bound device key pair=] is specific to a particular authenticator, the attestation may be tied to hardware roots of trust.)
+>>>>>>> main
 
             <dl class="switch">
                 : none
@@ -7403,7 +7411,11 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
 
         1. Let |spkSig| be the result of signing the [=assertion signature=] [input](#fig-signature) with the supplemental private key.
 
+<<<<<<< HEAD
             Note: the [=assertion signature=] [input](#fig-signature), and thus |spkSig|, covers the [=[RP]=]'s {{PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions/challenge}} because it includes the [=hash of the serialized client data=]. Thus the [=[RP]=] knows that |spkSig| is a fresh signature.
+=======
+The [=/AAGUID=] included in the <code>[=devicePubKey=]</code> extension output, if non-zero, identifies the make or model of hardware that is storing the [=device-bound key=]. This is distinct from the [=authData/attestedCredentialData/aaguid=] in the [=attested credential data=] of a [=multi-device credential=], which likely identifies something broader since such credentials are not bound to a single device. Thus the two AAGUIDs MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.
+>>>>>>> main
 
         1. Append |spkSig| to |spkSigs|.
 
@@ -7445,8 +7457,13 @@ The [=supplementalPubKeys=] extension adds the following [=struct/item=] to [=cr
 
         <dl dfn-for="supplementalPubKeys record" dfn-type="abstract-op">
             :   <dfn>aaguid</dfn>
+<<<<<<< HEAD
             ::  The [=AAGUID=] included with the supplemental public key.
                 This MAY be different from the [=AAGUID=] in the [$credential record/attestationObject$], if any, of the containing [=credential record=].
+=======
+            ::  The [=/AAGUID=] of the [=device-bound key=]'s [=managing authenticator=].
+                This MAY be different from the [=authData/attestedCredentialData/aaguid=] in the [$credential record/attestationObject$], if any, of the containing [=credential record=].
+>>>>>>> main
 
             :   <dfn>spk</dfn>
             ::  The public key portion of the supplemental public key.
```

Resolution:
```diff
diff --git a/index.bs b/index.bs
index c0fc031..fe14aee 100644
--- a/index.bs
+++ b/index.bs
@@ -7291,10 +7365,10 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
                 :: |attFormat| is "none" or "self", at the authenticator's discretion, and |attAaguid| is 16 zero bytes. (Note that, since the [=supplemental public key=] is already exercised during {{CredentialsContainer/create()|navigator.credentials.create()}} calls, the proof-of-possession property provided by "self" attestation is superfluous in that context.)
 
                 : indirect, direct
-                :: |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID. (Since the [=supplemental public key=]'s scope is different from the [=user credential=], it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a [=supplemental public key=] with &ldquo;device&rdquo; scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)
+                :: |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=/AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID. (Since the [=supplemental public key=]'s scope is different from the [=user credential=], it will often have a different attestation. For example, the attestation for a [=supplemental public key=] with &ldquo;device&rdquo; scope can be tied to hardware roots of trust, although it does not have to be.)
 
                 : enterprise
-                :: The [=[RP]=] wants to receive an [=attestation statement=] that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. [=Authenticators=] MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested [=RP ID=]. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for `direct` attestation. Otherwise |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID.
+                :: The [=[RP]=] wants to receive an [=attestation statement=] that may include uniquely identifying information. This is intended for controlled deployments within an enterprise where the organization wishes to tie registrations to specific authenticators. [=Authenticators=] MUST NOT provide such an attestation unless the user agent or authenticator configuration expressly permits it for the requested [=RP ID=]. If <i>not</i> permitted, then follow the steps for `direct` attestation. Otherwise |attFormat| is an [=attestation statement format=] appropriate for this [=authenticator=] based on {{AuthenticationExtensionsSupplementalPublicKeysInputs/attestationFormats}}, and |attAaguid| is the corresponding [=/AAGUID=], which MAY be the [=authenticator's=] AAGUID.
 
                     Note: CTAP2 does not currently provide for an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#makecred-enterpriseattestation">enterpriseAttestation</a> signal during an <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#authenticatorGetAssertion">authenticatorGetAssertion</a> call. Until that is changed, <a href="https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-20210615.html#platform-managed-enterprise-attestation">platform-managed enterprise attestation</a> will not work in that context with CTAP2 [=authenticators=].
             </dl>
@@ -7341,7 +7415,7 @@ The weight that [=[RPS]=] give to the presence of a signature from a supplementa
 
 ##### AAGUIDs ##### {#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-aaguid}
 
-The [=AAGUID=] included in the <code>[=supplementalPubKeys=]</code> extension output, if non-zero, aids a [=[RP]=] in validating the [=attestation statement=] of the supplemental public key. Its interpretation depends on the scope of the key. It may differ from the [=AAGUID=] in the [=attested credential data=] of a [=multi-device credential=]. Thus the AAGUID of [=supplemental public key=] MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.
+The [=/AAGUID=] included in the <code>[=supplementalPubKeys=]</code> extension output, if non-zero, aids a [=[RP]=] in validating the [=attestation statement=] of the supplemental public key. Its interpretation depends on the scope of the key. It may differ from the [=authData/attestedCredentialData/aaguid=] in the [=attested credential data=] of a [=multi-device credential=]. Thus the AAGUID of [=supplemental public key=] MAY be different in a single response and either, or both, may be zero depending on the options requested and authenticator behaviour.
 
 ##### Attestation calculations ##### {#sctn-supplemental-public-keys-attestation-calculations}
 
@@ -7371,8 +7445,8 @@ The [=supplementalPubKeys=] extension adds the following [=struct/item=] to [=cr
 
         <dl dfn-for="supplementalPubKeys record" dfn-type="abstract-op">
             :   <dfn>aaguid</dfn>
-            ::  The [=AAGUID=] included with the supplemental public key.
-                This MAY be different from the [=AAGUID=] in the [$credential record/attestationObject$], if any, of the containing [=credential record=].
+            ::  The [=/AAGUID=] included with the supplemental public key.
+                This MAY be different from the [=authData/attestedCredentialData/aaguid=] in the [$credential record/attestationObject$], if any, of the containing [=credential record=].
 
             :   <dfn>spk</dfn>
             ::  The public key portion of the supplemental public key.
```


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<a href="https://pr-preview.s3.amazonaws.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/1996.html" title="Last updated on Nov 15, 2023, 10:20 PM UTC (aedfab0)">Preview</a> | <a href="https://pr-preview.s3.amazonaws.com/w3c/webauthn/1996/28d90b2...aedfab0.html" title="Last updated on Nov 15, 2023, 10:20 PM UTC (aedfab0)">Diff</a>

See https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/pull/1996


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Received on Thursday, 16 November 2023 12:27:19 UTC