- From: Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>
- Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2009 17:55:13 -0500
- To: ext Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
- Cc: Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>, "public-webapps@w3.org WG" <public-webapps@w3.org>
Thanks for the proposal Thomas. This proposal requiring Basic Path Validation seems to conflict with X509Data being optional, the current language that I think we discussed during the meeting: Generation: 5c) The ds:KeyInfo element MAY be included and MAY include certificate, CRL and/or OCSP information. If so, it MUST be compliant with the[XMLDSIG11] specification. If certificates are used they MUST conform to the mandatory certificate format. Validation: If a ds:KeyInfo element is present then it MUST conform to the [XMLDSIG11]specification. If present then any certificate chain SHOULD be validated and any CRL or OCSP information may be used as appropriate [RFC5280].. I suggest we could also adopt your text by changing the final sentence above to If present then user agents MUST perform Basic Path Validation [RFC 5280] on the signing key and SHOULD perform revocation checking as appropriate. The set of acceptable trust anchors, and policy decisions based on the signer's identity are established through a security-critical out-of-band mechanism. Question: Should re require use of X509Data to convey certificates? I was suggesting not, since this could be conveyed out of band and it might not always be appropriate to include in every signature. Thoughts on this one? regards, Frederick Frederick Hirsch Nokia On Feb 25, 2009, at 9:23 AM, ext Thomas Roessler wrote: > I propose that we add te following text in the beginning of 6.2: > >> The validation procedure given in this section describes extensions >> to XML Signature Core Validation. In addition to the steps defined >> in these two specifications, user agents MUST perform Basic Path >> Validation [RFC 5280] on the signing key. The set of acceptable >> trust anchors, and policy decisions based on the signer's identity >> are established through a security-cirtical out-of-band mechanism. > > (If somebody can think of something nicer to say, that's fine as > well. Note that the Basic Path Validation requirement isn't really > new -- it's implicit to our use of X.509, if done properly. > Nevertheless, worth calling out properly.) > > -- > Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org> > > > > > > > >
Received on Wednesday, 25 February 2009 22:56:25 UTC