- From: Jeffrey Yasskin <notifications@github.com>
- Date: Sat, 24 May 2025 14:48:03 -0700
- To: w3ctag/design-reviews <design-reviews@noreply.github.com>
- Cc: Subscribed <subscribed@noreply.github.com>
- Message-ID: <w3ctag/design-reviews/pull/1094/review/2866496597@github.com>
@jyasskin commented on this pull request. > +That attribute would request that, whenever the cookie is sent to the server, +the client would cover that cookie with a signature. + +The use of the `Path` cookie parameter would ensure that +`Signed` cookies are only sent when requests are made to specific resources. +That would allow servers to limit how often they ask clients to generate signatures +by limiting how often the client requests the identified resources. +Those requests could be initiated through a redirect, fetch, or any other request, as needed. + +The choice of what fields to include under the signature is very important. +It is not likely to be sufficient to just cover `Cookie` in the list of signed content in `Signature-Input`. +Including a date (the `created` parameter), the method (`@method`), and the URL (`@target-uri`) +seem to be the minimum set of things that will prevent the signature from being reused. +It's possible that a more thorough security analysis will identifier other fields that need to be covered. + +## Some Challenges This section should be about how to accomplish various use cases, and I think it should start with a demo of how to satisfy the single threat model that DBSC currently covers: you trust the client's clock but not their timestamps. Then we can follow up with the extra flexibility that re-using cookies allows. ```suggestion ## Implementing various use cases ### Interactive proof if the client knows when to refresh ``` -- Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/pull/1094#pullrequestreview-2866496597 You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Message ID: <w3ctag/design-reviews/pull/1094/review/2866496597@github.com>
Received on Saturday, 24 May 2025 21:48:07 UTC