Re: [w3ctag/design-reviews] Fenced frames with local unpartitioned data access (Issue #975)

shivanigithub left a comment (w3ctag/design-reviews#975)

Hey folks,
To clarify, the earlier assertion on "_no sharing of cross-site data happens_ directly with the context outside the fenced frame" is about the way the API is designed. The API itself doesn't expose any metadata about the click which could encode cross-site data. However, covert channels could be created via a click and Martin's example above is what I have mentioned in point (2) in the linked [issue](https://github.com/WICG/turtledove/issues/990#issuecomment-2511630560) . Adding that response here for completeness:
**clicking on a given frame out of a grid of frames:** This is in our threat model and we are working on a solution to this, as part of the new [window.fence.notifyEvent API](https://github.com/WICG/fenced-frame/blob/master/explainer/fenced_frames_with_local_unpartitioned_data_access.md#changes-to-windowfence). Rate limiting the number of related fenced frames that the user can see will help these kind of attacks and we will update the explainer (and here), once the design is more fleshed out with the details of those rate limits.

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