Re: [w3c/ServiceWorker] Preventing server-forced updates (#822)

> This might be really useful for concerns about a CDN becoming malicious while the legitimate operator still controls the DNS, but doesn't do anything for the "don't trust the operator" use case.

Thanks @valpackett - yep, that's exactly the kind of scenario that a DNS webintegrity checksum would be intended to guard against; and correct, the mechanism does not protect against an untrusted operator.

(if an application _is_ free-and/or-open-source and reproducibly-buildable, then continuous inspection and confirmation of the published integrity hashes may be possible, but that'd be an independent process.  less-transparent sites could continue to offer content integrity)

I don't feel knowledgeable enough about either ServiceWorkers or web origins to comment on the `app://` origin suggestion, but to (try to) show some awareness: my understanding is that HTTPS is preferred for ServiceWorkers, so my proposal's attempt to design an approach that is backwards-compatible to HTTP could be out-of-context / off-topic here.

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