Re: [w3ctag/design-reviews] Review of signature-based resource loading restrictions. (#186)

Hey Mike,

We agree that this is an improvement over a simple hash, and are happy to see this move forward. As noted above, we'd like to see the ability to have multiple keys and signatures on a single resource to allow key rollover and cross-signing.

There is the one increased risk over a hash in that if an attacker gets a victim to accept a fraudulent key, they can continue to sign new versions of the resource without having to update the key (for example, publish a legit version of a library with a fraudulent key/signature, then after a while, replace the library with a malicious copy using the same key and the victim would likely not notice).

I do think that at some point we'll want a more powerful solution including key revocation and ownership proof, such as a certificate based solution, but I'm happy to wait for a future version and implementation experience with signed exchanges before going there.

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