- From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
- Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 15:08:29 -0700
- To: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
- Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>
Received on Thursday, 21 April 2016 22:09:16 UTC
I think you're correct: this scheme explicitly calls out PIV, and while some sort of PKCS#11 bridge sounds like a great idea to PIV card manufacturers, from my perspective (as someone sitting in the middle between the PIV card manufacturers and the browsers) I do not think browser vendors are interested in generally adopting a PKCS#11 bridge into browsers. I agree with not exposing PKCS#11 into the browser: authentication strategies for the web need to respect the Same-Origin Policy, and PKCS#11 does not. Without respecting SOP, users are asked to make decisions about the mapping of origins to their hardware tokens, and any time you introduce user choice into authentication you're making the user experience more hostile and weakening security. -- Tony Arcieri
Received on Thursday, 21 April 2016 22:09:16 UTC