- From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 14:45:41 -0400
- To: ryan-w3-web-security@sleevi.com
- Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>
On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 2:31 PM, Ryan Sleevi <ryan-w3-web-security@sleevi.com> wrote: > On Mon, May 18, 2015 11:23 am, Jeffrey Walton wrote: >> On Mon, May 18, 2015 at 2:22 PM, Ryan Sleevi >> > I suspect you may have meant DANE (which is for clients). >> Actually, NO. >> >> Its security specific context information. I'm happy to use any >> security specific context information I can get my hands on. >> > Then you'd be wrong for using CAA, as everyone who has worked with CAA can > easily tell you, and you'd be causing problems and discouraging deployment > of CAA, making (almost) everyone who has worked with CAA sad. :) You really should read up on security diversification strategies. Guttman has a very good treatment of the subject in his book, Engineering Security (https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/book.pdf). > So again, no, that's what not CAA is for. (Though this group isn't the > best place to explain CAA or how it should work, it was enough to qualify > precisely why CAA has no relevance of bearing for clients, lest someone > think it does) Thanks. Jeff
Received on Monday, 18 May 2015 18:46:09 UTC