- From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2015 12:42:07 +0100
- To: Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- CC: GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>, public-web-security@w3.org
On 2015-02-03 12:34, Rigo Wenning wrote: Rigo, Although I agree with what you are saying there's a problem: None of the stuff you are referring to has ever been directly connected to the [UNTRUSTED] web, they are always used with a trusted App + GU. This component and thinking is entirely absent from all proposals submitted to date. Anders > --trimming CC > > On Tuesday 03 February 2015 2:53:59 Ryan Sleevi wrote: >> I know of zero eID schemes that properly preserve privacy - and that is >> including PIV's notion of derived credentials - and so if the question is >> "Can we bring these, as-is, to the web", then the answer is and should be a >> resounding no. > > Ryan, > > privacy is the wrong argument here: > > 1/ paying using eID is as private as paying with a credit card > 2/ my ID-card eID can be used in many ways, including trigger anon-credentials > using double-blind sigs (Camenisch et.al), which are privacy preserving > 3/ you emit a reserve with "as-is" but you remain unclear how far of a bridge > is needed to overcome the "as-is" and who should build that bridge. > > I think eID schemes are not made for privacy, they are used within an > environment that is more or less privacy preserving (e.g. EU regulation). So > the privacy argument has nothing to do with webcrypto. eID schemes may not fit > your use case, but eGov e.g. is a use case where I have to be identified but I > also want to be secure and use webcrypto in my browser to have end-to-end > security. > > Finally, after years of privacy work, I think most of the meat is in data > collection limitation and data retention times. So if you throw away the eID > after 24 hours, I don't think there is much of a privacy issue. But that's not > for webcrypto to specify. > > My question was rather whether the webcrypto system can improve security of > systems like the Estonian eID scheme where everyone has an eID, can vote, do > all administrative actions etc. It can only do so if the API is open enough to > also connect to those systems. Will the web remain relevant for them or will > they have to create some "App" to connect to their eID system? > > Because this cuts both ways. If the API is open enough to consume more than > one smartcard/crypto system, it also creates pressure for the eID system to > evolve towards fully catering to the web. If you have to necessarily pass by > FIDO first, I think this would be much more difficult (although not > impossible) > > Let me finish by my most favored phrase from Peter Brown (Board of OASIS) who > said: "Standards are great, please use mine". We shouldn't fall into that > trap. We should be as inclusive as possible without breaking things IMHO. > > > --Rigo >
Received on Tuesday, 3 February 2015 11:42:42 UTC