- From: Mountie Lee <mountie@paygate.net>
- Date: Wed, 1 May 2013 12:20:58 +0900
- To: public-web-security@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CAE-+aYKjSURs7wTSX2LYapjiWFNA30+Q=h4kZvcYbTgp+0PoEQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi. I'm Member of WebCrypto WG. the working group is trying to define crypto related APIs in user agents. one of my issue is about origin-free key access. the key is important material in WebCrypto API which can be used for encrypting, signing, verifying and so on. and the key is bound to same-origin policy that is one of important web security models. when we review the policy with key ownership issue, it has some conflict with current security model. if the key is owned by provisioner mostly like web applications or service provider as server side, same-origin policy has no issue. but if the key is owned by user (as the human), same-origin policy has some conflict with current use cases. key means certificate and it's binded private key. normally certificate key pair owner will think "this is MY KEY" in some case, it is stored in secure token like smartcard and possessed in user's pocket. with current TLS client certificate key pair, the key can be used on any sites with user's decision WebCrypto API is trying to control TLS session and certificate key pair with API. but between participants, still we fail to get agreement for origin-free security model for certificate key pair. my suggestion was when the certificate is valid and has trust chain up to browser's trusted root CA, the certificate key pair should be origin free. I have reviewed many countermeasures of same-origin policy like CORS, script-src, postMessage but those are not match our non-US banking use cases (Korea and EU...) is my suggestion acceptable in web security model? regards mountie. -- Mountie Lee PayGate CTO, CISSP Tel : +82 2 2140 2700 E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net ======================================= PayGate Inc. THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
Received on Wednesday, 1 May 2013 03:21:42 UTC