I would also note that Dirk Balfanz (the author of that draft) has written a more verbose / user-friendly explanation of Origin Bound Certificates and Channel Bound Cookies, here: http://www.browserauth.net/channel-bound-cookies -mh -- Michael Hanson Mozilla Labs On Mar 12, 2012, at 7:25 AM, Richard L. Barnes wrote: > There's some related work proposed in the IETF TLS working group. The idea there is to bind cookies to TLS client certificates, so as long as the private key corresponding to the cert is only on one machine, the cookie can only be used on one machine. > <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-obc-01> > > Of course, you could also just associate cookies with a client IP addresses on the server side... > > > > On Mar 11, 2012, at 11:53 AM, Enduro USA Tour wrote: > >> >> I'm an independent security researcher and am interested in addressing >> Related Domain Cookie Attacks. See these links for more info on the >> problem: >> >> http://security.stackexchange.com/q/12412/396 and >> http://stackoverflow.com/q/9636857/328397 >> >> I would like to pitch a few approaches on addressing this vulnerability, >> but before I do that, is anyone aware of a solution that binds a cookie to >> a host, limiting the ability of the attacker to transfer or replay it on a >> different host? That is essentially the vulnerability that is described in >> the links above. >> >> Before I pitch my solution, I'd like to see if you agree that the issue is >> relevant to this group, and of importance. >> >> Thanks for your time! >> >> Chris Lamont Mankowski >> >> >> > >
Received on Monday, 12 March 2012 17:04:08 UTC