- From: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
- Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2011 12:55:49 -0800
- To: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- Cc: public-web-security@w3.org
Another possibility is for the worker to be subject to the CSP policy that comes with it's script. Also, it's always trivial for a script running in a document to bypass connect-src. A better threat model to think about is a site that executes only trusted script but that might accidentally make an XMLHttpRequest for a URL supplied by the attacker. In that model, it doesn't matter whether a worker uses a different CSP policy from the main document. Adam On Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 12:50 PM, Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi folks > > The CSP draft currently doesn't mention anything about CSP being > inherited by workers. In particular, a worker's XMLHttpRequest should > be subject to the original document's connect-src (or default-src as > the case may be). Else, it is trivial to bypass connect-src. > > -devdatta > >
Received on Sunday, 27 November 2011 20:56:51 UTC