- From: Helen Wang (MSR) <helenw@microsoft.com>
- Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2010 15:23:49 +0000
- To: "sird@rckc.at" <sird@rckc.at>, Devdatta <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>
- CC: Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com>, Collin Jackson <collin@collinjackson.com>, "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <5E8594482274E748852EF42CF7B321C427DD5BB7@TK5EX14MBXC126.redmond.corp.microsoft.>
Exactly, Eduardo! Thanks, Helen From: sirdarckcat@gmail.com [mailto:sirdarckcat@gmail.com] On Behalf Of sird@rckc.at Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2010 9:37 PM To: Devdatta Cc: Maciej Stachowiak; Collin Jackson; Helen Wang (MSR); public-web-security@w3.org Subject: Re: text/sandboxed-html a <script src=> inside an <iframe sandbox=> is the same as a <sandbox src=>, the difference is that the later is only javascript, and the former is JS and HTML (and css maybe). If I understood correctly, Helen things that HTML is dangerous, since it executes in the context of the page serving it, while JS by itself is not.. Greetings!! -- Eduardo http://www.sirdarckcat.net/ On Wed, Jan 27, 2010 at 12:55 PM, Devdatta <dev.akhawe@gmail.com<mailto:dev.akhawe@gmail.com>> wrote: Hi Helen, It seems to me that your proposal and the HTML5 proposal are solving different problems. This proposal talks about how to serve scripts with null privileges while the HTML5 proposal is how to serve HTTP resources (a.k.a HTML documents) with null privileges. Am I correct in thinking that whatever a script with null privileges can achieve, an iframe sandbox can also achieve ? In particular, what are the usecases that are covered by serving untrusted scripts but aren't covered by serving untrusted resources ? Regards Devdatta 2010/1/26 Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com<mailto:mjs@apple.com>>: > > On Jan 26, 2010, at 2:44 PM, Collin Jackson wrote: > >> >> Since there is no mechanism preventing the attacker from making an >> iframe that points at the <sandbox>'s "src" attribute, the site needs >> some way of preventing the content from rendering as HTML, even though >> it will normally be script in non-attack scenarios. Serving up content >> with the mime type text/javascript (or application/x-javascript) works >> about as well as text/html-sandboxed (same IE6 and Flash caveats). > > Using a JavaScript type is likely to make some or all of the content readable (and not just embeddable) cross-site. So even though it won't then be rendered as HTML, this choice of MIME type has risks. > > Regards, > Maciej > > >
Received on Wednesday, 27 January 2010 15:24:25 UTC