Re: Preloading using JS instead of a tag

On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 9:08 AM Hayato Ito <hayato@google.com> wrote:

> Let me update the status.
>
> We are considering using <script> elements as a declarative form [1],
> instead of <link> elements, to address security concerns.
> However, before proceeding this way, we'd like to confirm one thing; Can't
> we use <link> elements even if we limit subresources loaded from the bundle
> only to the same-origin resources to the bundle's URL?
>
> Let me explain with an example:
>
> Suppose we have a bundle, "https://example.com/sub.wbn", which includes
> the following three resources:
> - https://example.com/a.png
> - https://example.com/b.png
> - https://other.com/c.png
>
> We use this bundle as follows:
>
> <link rel=webbundle href="https://example.com/sub.wbn"
>       resources="https://example.com/a.png https://example.com/b.png
> https://other.com/c.png">
> <img src=https://example.com/a.png>
> <img src=https://example.com/b.png>
> <img src=https://other.com/c.png>
>
> In this case,
> - We load a.png and b.png from the bundle because their origins,
> https://example.com, are the same to the bundle's origin,
> https://example.com.
> - however, we don't load c.png from the bundle because its origin,
> https://other.com, is different from the bundle's origin,
> https://example.com.
>
> This means that a bundle is effectively used to package subresources in
> the one same origin. The different origin subresources are unlikely to be
> packaged in one bundle.
>
> Suppose that we limit subresource loading this way, does security
> concerns still apply to the usage of <link> elements?
>
>
Thanks for the update! I think there are still some security concerns
remaining. The concerns are much smaller of course (and limiting to the
origin is a smart idea!), but I worry that the risk is not really about the
origins here, but rather about being able to change the content under a
given URL (without, say, a service worker installation) on the embedding
page. It "feels" like it should require a capability of injecting a script
element to the embedder.

To make sure I understand the setup correctly - in order to have a correct
(i.e. able to replace the resources) bundle served from example.com, one
needs to have the capability to serve anything under example.com (e.g. the
TLS keys)? If the attacker needs to have anything less than that, then the
potential attack is still possible for shared origins (e.g.
https://foo.example/~alice/bundle.wbn could replace https://foo.example/~bob
resources requested on another page). The shared origin is usually not an
issue, as Alice can trivially XSS Bob, but here the attack (replacing the
resources by injecting a <link>) is happening on _another_ page, e.g. a
https://i.only.trust.bob.example/.



>
> [1] POC CL:
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/2402927
>
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 4:15 PM Hayato Ito <hayato@google.com> wrote:
>
>> Regarding <script> as a declarative form, It seems there is a
>> similar proposal, <script type="importamap">.
>>
>> (copy/pasted from https://github.com/WICG/import-maps)
>>
>> <script type="importmap">
>> {
>>   "imports": {
>>     "moment": "/node_modules/moment/src/moment.js",
>>     "lodash": "/node_modules/lodash-es/lodash.js"
>>   }
>> }
>> </script>
>>
>> We'll report back once we know the status of <script type="importmap">.
>> We might learn from there.
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 10:55 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavweiss@google.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Krzysztof and I talked about this offline and reached some conclusions:
>>>
>>>    - `<script>` seems like the right declarative home for this - to
>>>    make sure it's defended against similarly to other XSS vectors
>>>    - A declarative solution can still be racy if specified naively, and
>>>    the processing model should make sure that it is not (e.g. by not loading
>>>    the bundle if resources covered by it were already fetched)
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 12:42 PM Krzysztof Kotowicz <koto@google.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I understand that. My question is, are we actually avoiding races if we
>>>> kept, say, link element?
>>>>
>>>> <script>
>>>> document.head.appendChild(scriptWithBundleUrl);
>>>> document.head.appendChild(webBundleLink);
>>>> </script>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 12:11 PM Yoav Weiss <yoavweiss@google.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Think of the following HTML, based on Hayato's example:
>>>>> ```
>>>>> <link rel=stylesheet href="https://www.example.com/unbundled.css">
>>>>> <script>
>>>>> document.webbundles.add({
>>>>>   href: 'https://www.example.com/foo.wbn
>>>>> <https://www.exmaple.com/foo.wbn>',
>>>>>   resources: ['https://www.example.com/a.js
>>>>> <https://www.exmaple.com/a.png>', 'https://www.example.com/b.css
>>>>> <https://www.exmaple.com/b.css>', ...]
>>>>> });
>>>>> </script>
>>>>> <link rel=stylesheet href="https://www.example.com/b.css">
>>>>> <script src="https://www.example.com/a.js">
>>>>> ```
>>>>>
>>>>> The browser (all browsers, in subtly different ways) would take the
>>>>> HTML tokens, scan them and speculatively preload a.js and b.css based on
>>>>> that, before executing the inline script (which is blocked on the style
>>>>> above it).
>>>>> Aside: I believe that even without the blocking "unbundled" style the
>>>>> race would be often lost. May merit testing in the different browsers.
>>>>>
>>>>> While we could ask developers to not do that, and always trigger
>>>>> request for bundled resources from JS, that would have significant
>>>>> ergonomics, adoption and performance implications, and I'd much rather we
>>>>> don't go that route.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 12:01 PM Krzysztof Kotowicz <koto@google.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 11:49 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavweiss@google.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we want WebBundles to fit into today's pages (which e.g. include
>>>>>>> `<script src>` tags), we need an imperative mechanism to load them and tell
>>>>>>> the browser about the resources they contain.
>>>>>>> An imperative mechanism to load them would only be effective for
>>>>>>> dynamically loaded resources, which are inherently slower to discover. It
>>>>>>> would be a shame if we ended up encouraging that pattern.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Would moving away from `<link>` to e.g. `<base>` (as Mike suggested)
>>>>>>> or `<script type=bundle>` address your concerns?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would prefer base or script, yes. But is the raciness problem
>>>>>> solved, given that DOM is mutable from JS? That would need to be addressed
>>>>>> anyhow if I understand correctly.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 11:33 AM Krzysztof Kotowicz <koto@google.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The DOM tree can also change dynamically. If the element that
>>>>>>>> controls the bundle loading is inserted via JS, would that
>>>>>>>> also affect raciness? If so, there's little way around it, short of
>>>>>>>> ignoring the behavior when added dynamically (which might be surprising for
>>>>>>>> authors).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 10:58 AM Yoav Weiss <yoavweiss@google.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> An imperative mechanism to load bundles would be inherently racy -
>>>>>>>>> the preloadScanner would not be aware of it, and can kick off script
>>>>>>>>> requests before their bundles are discovered.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If `<link>` is a risky choice here, I'm fine with a different tag
>>>>>>>>> to do the same. I have no strong opinion regarding what would be a good
>>>>>>>>> alternative.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 10:44 AM Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I don't have a strong opinion about the mechanism, but I do think
>>>>>>>>>> the risk ascribed to the `<link>` approach is real.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If declarative mechanisms are preferred, I wonder if an extension
>>>>>>>>>> to `<base>` would be more appropriate here than an extension to `<link>`.
>>>>>>>>>> `<base>` already affects resource loading across the page (in kinda
>>>>>>>>>> terrible ways, but still!), and so already needs to be addressed by folks
>>>>>>>>>> who aim to sanitize user input.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It also is suggested to be invalid outside of `<head>`, which
>>>>>>>>>> would be similarly helpful if browsers implemented that as a requirement;
>>>>>>>>>> there doesn't seem to be a WPT for it, and Chromium at least would fail.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> -mike
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 9:18 AM Hayato Ito <hayato@google.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ryosuke. Thanks for sharing concerns.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I'm wondering if we have imperative JS APIs which
>>>>>>>>>>> are *equivalent* to declarative one, some of the security concerns will be
>>>>>>>>>>> addressed?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Imperative JS APIs can be something like:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> <script>
>>>>>>>>>>> // Tentative ideas. API surfaces do not matter for now.
>>>>>>>>>>> document.webbundles.add({
>>>>>>>>>>>   href: 'https://www.exmaple.com/foo.wbn',
>>>>>>>>>>>   resources: ['https://www.exmaple.com/a.png', '
>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.exmaple.com/b.css', ...]
>>>>>>>>>>> });
>>>>>>>>>>> </script>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> # Then, UA will try to load 'https://www.exmaple.com/a.png'
>>>>>>>>>>> (the same origin resource of the bundle) from the specified bundle, instead
>>>>>>>>>>> of the network.
>>>>>>>>>>> <img src='https://www.exmaple.com/a.png'>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Is my understanding correct?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Aug 28, 2020 at 2:30 PM Ryosuke Niwa <rniwa@apple.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Aug 27, 2020, at 1:05 PM, Jeffrey Yasskin <
>>>>>>>>>>>> jyasskin@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Web Perf experts,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We're working
>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5710618575241216> on
>>>>>>>>>>>> using (unsigned) web bundles to help with preloading subresources. The
>>>>>>>>>>>> current design is at
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/blob/master/explainers/subresource-loading.md,
>>>>>>>>>>>> but roughly the idea is that a page would build a bundle of the
>>>>>>>>>>>> subresources it intends to use and put a
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <link rel="webbundle" href="/the_bundle.wbn" scope="/resources">
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> with their other preloads (or one of several variations). After
>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> <script src="/resources/foo.js">
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> would find the version in the bundle instead of having to fetch
>>>>>>>>>>>> it independently.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This isn’t about preloading is it? This will actually affect
>>>>>>>>>>>> the resource being used by that script element. preload doesn’t do that so
>>>>>>>>>>>> this is a pretty different feature.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/issues/580, Krzysztof
>>>>>>>>>>>> worries that adding any new way for a <link> tag to affect script loading
>>>>>>>>>>>> is a security risk, because pages may not be as careful about preventing
>>>>>>>>>>>> users from injecting <link> tags as they are about <script> tags. Instead,
>>>>>>>>>>>> he suggests using a Javascript API to tell the browser to preload
>>>>>>>>>>>> subresources using a bundle.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That would be a pretty serious security risk. Putting all other
>>>>>>>>>>>> objections against web packaging / web bundles aside, this will be a pretty
>>>>>>>>>>>> big show stopper.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> - R. Niwa
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>> Hayato
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> koto@ / Krzysztof Kotowicz / Google
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> koto@ / Krzysztof Kotowicz / Google
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> koto@ / Krzysztof Kotowicz / Google
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> Hayato
>>
>
>
> --
> Hayato
>


-- 
koto@ / Krzysztof Kotowicz / Google