Re: [web-nfc] Verify security model

_From @sicking on February 18, 2015 23:11_

> Re "it might be ok to simply ask the user if it's ok for this 
website to read NFC tags", I think it's ok to infer the user's intent 
to allow a page to read a tag, from the fact that the user touched the
 tag with their device while the page was "frontmost". Whether the tag
 is a Web tag doesn't really affect this.

My main point was actually that we can be less restrictive when it 
comes to *reading* non-WebNFC NFC tags than when it comes to *writing*
 to them.

But we might very well not even need a prompt.

The only concern that I had was that the user might not have intended 
to touch their device to a tag. For example the user might not have 
realized that a tag existed in the given location at all. But I agree 
that's a bit far-fetched.

But you make a good point that that scenario isn't that different 
between WebNFC tags and non-WebNFC tags.

Either way this seems like a solvable problem.

> Separately, I think that the id NDEF record is probably too limited 
to identify WebNFC devices. We probably want the device to be able to 
express a set of origins that are allowed to access it, rather than 
just a single origin, and IIUC the id record can't hold enough data to
 do that in general.

I don't have a strong opinion on this. Assuming that we allow 
cross-origin iframes to use the WebNFC API, you can always have one 
origin be the one which reads the tag, but then forward that 
information to any set of origins using parent.postMessage().

-- 
GitHub Notif of comment by zolkis
See https://github.com/w3c/web-nfc/issues/2#issuecomment-79224964

Received on Friday, 13 March 2015 18:31:04 UTC