app level security

Jeffrey wrote:

> Bluetooth LE Secure Connections establish a connection between a
> Central and a Peripheral device that's secure against other nearby
> radios. However, Central devices often run many applications, only one
> of which the user intends to use with a given Peripheral. Current
> Bluetooth pairing mechanisms allow these other applications to
> communicate with the Peripheral in a way that's indistinguishable from
> the application the user intended. [1]
> 
> For example, the FIDO protocol
> (https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/overview/ <https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/overview/>) assumes the FIDO
> device is talking to an application that honestly reports the origin
> of signature requests. If an untrusted device or application can talk
> to the FIDO device, it can request a signature for an arbitrary
> origin, which breaks FIDO's protection against phishing. Bluetooth
> secure pairing defends against the untrusted device, but not the
> untrusted application.
> 
> We have a couple ideas for dealing with the problem, but we're
> definitely open to better ideas this group comes up with.

This would seem to be a problem for the FIDO device to address. If someone were to attempt to connect via the browser API, then it would be up to the FIDO device to determine that the connecting device/app is not authorised, and to close the connection accordingly.  This security challenge is thus something we don’t need to address for the browser API.

What am I missing here?

—
   Dave Raggett <dsr@w3.org <mailto:dsr@w3.org>>