- From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
- Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2007 23:29:20 +0200
- To: Dick Hardt <dick@sxip.com>
- Cc: "Ben Laurie" <benl@google.com>, "Dan Schutzer" <dan.schutzer@fstc.org>, "Thomas Roessler" <tlr@w3.org>, michael.mccormick@wellsfargo.com, ses@ll.mit.edu, public-wsc-wg@w3.org, kjell.rydjer@swedbank.se, steve@shinkuro.com, public-usable-authentication@w3.org
* Dick Hardt: > DNSEC provides a tighter binding of the public key to the domain name > then the current CA infrastructure that has been shown to issue certs > for domains to entities other then those controlling the domain. You can't really compare a non-deployed protocol to a broken process. The result is meaningless. When deployed, the protocol might end up with broken processes, too.
Received on Friday, 27 April 2007 21:29:40 UTC