- From: James A. Donald <jamesd@echeque.com>
- Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2006 10:09:14 +1000
- To: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Frederick Hirsch wrote: > I have a general question about secure chrome, which I > think reiterates what George said. > > What is to prevent an attack on secure chrome by > simply replacing the entire browser implementation, so > that the secure chrome isn't effective since the > underlying code is modified? Is the intent to remove > insecure functionality so that this attack would not > work undetected? > > (in this case open source seems to enable a > modification/replacement attack on the entire browser > implementation itself) The best we can do is ensure that only installed programs can commit fraud against a reasonably competent and vigilant user, which at present we are not doing. Right now web pages can commit fraud against a competent and vigilant user. With trusted computing, we can do better than that, but that is not a reason to deploy trusted computing until we do the best we can with what we already have. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG k+IHXg2ILW7fi6B8oNMBEGVyvcTVySWCy+jnhcSf 4iHwsVpS2Wz7/UYldV4dAsd9Xsw82AhF6IttAd06o
Received on Tuesday, 13 June 2006 15:04:22 UTC