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Re: Secure Chrome

From: James A. Donald <jamesd@echeque.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2006 10:09:14 +1000
Message-ID: <448E022A.2050506@echeque.com>
To: public-usable-authentication@w3.org

Frederick Hirsch wrote:
 > I have a general question about secure chrome, which I
 > think reiterates what George said.
 > What is to prevent an attack on secure chrome by
 > simply replacing the entire browser implementation, so
 > that the secure chrome isn't effective since the
 > underlying code is modified? Is the intent to remove
 > insecure functionality so that this attack would not
 > work undetected?
 > (in this case open source seems to enable a
 > modification/replacement attack on the entire browser
 > implementation itself)

The best we can do is ensure that only installed
programs can commit fraud against a reasonably competent
and vigilant user, which at present we are not doing.
Right now web pages can commit fraud against a competent
and vigilant user.

With trusted computing, we can do better than that, but
that is not a reason to deploy trusted computing until
we do the best we can with what we already have.

          James A. Donald
Received on Tuesday, 13 June 2006 15:04:22 UTC

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