RE: Secure Chrome

Both if unalterable chrome indicated when you were in safe mode, and if we
could educate customers that they are only talking to their Bank when in
safe mode. They would have an indication that all is not right if they are
not in safe mode. Conversely, if I put the customer in safe mode, then that
eliminates lots of cross site scripting and other sorts of attacks. This may
not be perfect, but it does make things more difficult. 

 

  _____  

From: public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org
[mailto:public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org] On Behalf Of Mary Ellen
Zurko
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 9:00 AM
To: Dan Schutzer
Cc: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Subject: RE: Secure Chrome

 


But of course a malicious web site will not go into the high risk safe mode.
And a user naive enough to get easily phished is unlikely to think of doing
it explicitly. 

Mary Ellen Zurko, STSM, IBM Lotus CTO Office       (t/l 333-6389)
IBM Lotus/WPLC Security Strategy and Architecture





"Dan Schutzer" <dan.schutzer@fstc.org> 

04/14/2006 08:56 AM 


To

"'Mary Ellen Zurko'" <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com> 


cc

<public-usable-authentication@w3.org> 


Subject

RE: Secure Chrome

 


 

 




One approach is to let the web site and the customer determine when they
want to go into high risk safe mode transaction. 
  

 

  _____  


From: public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org
[mailto:public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org] On Behalf Of Mary Ellen
Zurko
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2006 8:28 AM
To: Dan Schutzer
Cc: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Subject: RE: Secure Chrome 
  

Interestingly enough, the question George is asking, is whether you as a
website developer are willing to design the part of your web that deals with
high risk transactions to not use any active content at all. 

The question George isn't asking is how a browser would know that a high
risk transaction was about to occur with a malicious site. 

I expect there to be some interesting work at SOUPS addressing this sort of
question. As I mentioned at the workshop (which Danny hated to hear), some
of this is still at the research phase. Which makes it hard to standardize. 
       Mez 

Mary Ellen Zurko, STSM, IBM Lotus CTO Office       (t/l 333-6389)
IBM Lotus/WPLC Security Strategy and Architecture


"Dan Schutzer" <dan.schutzer@fstc.org> 
Sent by: public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org 

04/12/2006 02:50 PM 

 


To

"'George Staikos'" <staikos@kde.org>, <public-usable-authentication@w3.org> 


cc

  


Subject

RE: Secure Chrome


  

 


  

 






I think, just as the web browsing experience now allows a user to set and
change various levels of security and privacy depending on the website, I
would think they could be induced to allow websites and customers to select
for more high risk transactions a safe browsing mode to be invoked. It is an
idea whose time may have come. I as a user would welcome such modes within
my control, so that when I am transacting and exchanging highly sensitive
information, I can work in a more secure mode.

-----Original Message-----
From: public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org
[mailto:public-usable-authentication-request@w3.org] On Behalf Of George
Staikos
Sent: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 1:55 PM
To: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Subject: Re: Secure Chrome


On Tuesday 11 April 2006 18:30, Mary Ellen Zurko wrote:
> No active content at all. Zippo. No javascript. No Java. No ActiveX.
>
> Web browsing the way nature intended :-).
>
> Yes, there's a lot of things you couldn't do with such a browser. But it
> has the benefit of simplicity.

Do you think any website developers will ever accept such a thing? :-)  I 
think not...

-- 
George Staikos
KDE Developer
http://www.kde.org/
Staikos Computing Services Inc.
http://www.staikos.net/