- From: Justin Brookman <jbrookman@cdt.org>
- Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2015 16:09:48 -0400
- To: "Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com>
- Cc: Walter van Holst <walter@vanholst.com>, Tracking Protection Working Group <public-tracking@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAF2uvujAx7Fx1QML8vb7LUW2qzKSRN5nQ112kc7AE77+HRs9NQ@mail.gmail.com>
So, to be clear, Section 3.3 would read in full (forgive dodgy formatting):
When a third party to a given user action receives a DNT:1 signal in a
related network interaction, that party may collect and use data about
those network interactions when:
1. a user has explicitly granted consent, as described below (Section 4.
Consent
<http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#user-granted-exceptions>
);
2. data is collected for the set of permitted uses described below
(Section 3.3.2 Permitted Uses
<http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#permitted-uses>
);
3. or, the data is permanently de-identified
<http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#dfn-permanently-de-identified>
as
defined in this specification (Section 2.9 De-identification [ADD INTERNAL
LINK]).
Other than under those enumerated conditions, that party MUST NOT
• collect data from this network interaction that would result in
data regarding this particular user being associated across
multiple distinct contexts;
• retain, use, or share data derived from this particular user's
activity outside the context in which that activity occurred; nor,
• use data about this particular user's activity in other contexts
(e.g., to personalize a response to this network interaction)
EXAMPLE 2
An embedded widget provider (a third party to users' interactions with
various sites) counts visitors' country of origin and device type but
removes identifiers in order to permanently de-identify
<http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#dfn-permanently-de-identified>
collected data. For the purposes of this specification, the party is
not tracking <http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#dfn-tracking>
the user and can create a static site-wide tracking status resource
with a tracking status value of N to indicate that status.
Outside the permitted uses and explicitly-granted exceptions listed
below, a third party to a given user action must not collect, share,
or associate with related network interactions any identifiers that
identify a specific user, user agent, or device. For example, a third
party that does not require unique user identifiers for one of the
permitted uses must not place a unique identifier in cookies or other
browser-based local storage mechanisms.
*************
JB: The rest of third-party compliance would I think not be affected
(apart from the replacement of the term "tracking data" with "that
data" and "data about that activity" in 3.3.1.3 and Example 4,
respectively): http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/drafts/tracking-compliance.html#third-party-compliance
On Thu, Apr 9, 2015 at 3:24 PM, Roy T. Fielding <fielding@gbiv.com> wrote:
> On Apr 9, 2015, at 7:48 AM, Walter van Holst wrote:
>
> > On 2015-04-09 16:38, Justin Brookman wrote:
> >> Right, this is a different issue than the use of the term "tracking
> >> data." Contractual agreements with third parties to not try to
> >> reidentify data sets are one way to ensure that deidentified data
> >> stays that way. For example, the FTC's test for deidentification is
> >> (1) a reasonable belief that the data can't be reidentified, (2) a
> >> commitment not to reidentify, and (3) a commitment not to reidentify
> >> from everyone you give the data set to.
> >> I personally would be fine adding language about this to this
> >> non-normative guidance --- would just adding "and agreements" to the
> >> second bullet do it?
> >
> > Substitute "agreements" with safeguards and put in non-normative
> language that safeguards may be provided through agreements and we're
> closer to meaning and scope of the original text again.
>
> Technical safeguards are mentioned in the first bullet. I am fine with
> Justin's addition of agreements to the second bullet (even though it has
> nothing to do with the removal of "original tracking data" that we have
> been discussing).
>
> I don't consider agreements to be a safeguard -- I thought the whole point
> of being a safeguard was that it is effective even if a business fails
> to uphold an agreement. Hence, the separate bullets.
>
> ....Roy
>
>
Received on Thursday, 9 April 2015 20:10:37 UTC