- From: John Simpson <john@consumerwatchdog.org>
- Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2013 19:10:27 -0700
- To: Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>
- Cc: "public-tracking@w3.org public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
Yes, thank you. On Jun 27, 2013, at 4:26 PM, Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com> wrote: > John, > > Thank you for the clarification - I was addressing the good/bad signal issue. > > Under this proposal, DNT:1 data MUST be de-identified and then later de-linked. > > DNT:0 data MAY be de-identified and then later de-linked but would not be required to. Data resulting from DNT:0 will have far greater utility than DNT:1 data so there are incentives for companies to obtain user consent to gain this additional value. > > DNT:unset depends on Legal jurisdiction. > > Does this answer your question? > > - Shane > > -----Original Message----- > From: John Simpson [mailto:john@consumerwatchdog.org] > Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 3:57 PM > To: Shane Wiley > Cc: public-tracking@w3.org public-tracking@w3.org > Subject: Re: De-identification and 3 data states? > > Hi Shane, > > I'm not sure if you understood what I meant. There may be "bad" DNT signals that don't accurately reflect a user's intent. I'm not asking about those cases. > > What I was wondering was how would data that came from UAs where DNT unset or DNT:0 be treated? How would it be treated differently that the Red/Yellow/Green process described. > > Would it not be simpler to treat all data collected the same way under this system? How exactly would non-DNT:1 data be handled that differs from DNT:1 data? > > Thans, > John > > > On Jun 27, 2013, at 3:32 PM, Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com> wrote: > >> John, >> >> I believe the problem of non-intuitive parties injecting the DNT signal is going to grow unbounded - even more so than it already is today - once we announce a completed standard. In many cases it's impossible to disambiguate a "good" signal from a "bad" one - so we're likely to recognize many of them. Since there will still be situations where it's obvious and able to be detected when a "bad" signal is being sent, I believe we should still have an option of sending the "D" response (disregard) but I see the probability/percentage of that outcome being MUCH lower than the volume of DNT:1 we're likely to see as this advances. It's simply too easy to inject DNT:1 into the page response flow using our current approach... >> >> Long story short - in this proposal I could imagine most, if not all, DNT signals are recognized. Please understand this is a SIGNIFICANT compromise position so hopefully you'll honor it as such to help us find middle-ground and a consensus position. I hope we both agree this will be a huge step forward for online consumer privacy. >> >> NOTE - I speak only for myself on this situation - not Yahoo! or other industry participants - BUT I suspect you'll find my position to be shared by many others. >> >> - Shane >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: John Simpson [mailto:john@consumerwatchdog.org] >> Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 2:38 PM >> To: Shane Wiley; public-tracking@w3.org public-tracking@w3.org >> Subject: De-identification and 3 data states? >> >> Hi Shane, >> >> A question prompted by your slide presentation about de-identification: Do you envision only data collected from UA's sending a DNT:1 message to be handled in the manner described, or would industry simply process all data collected in this way? >> >> Thanks, >> John >> >> >
Received on Friday, 28 June 2013 02:10:55 UTC