W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-tracking@w3.org > May 2012

Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]

From: イアンフェッティ <ifette@google.com>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 16:05:29 -0700
Message-ID: <CAF4kx8e+5Xcm8A-_jfm3_dQqrU7yJSG=+sx+SyTjjcAUJTgK3Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com>
Cc: Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>, Justin Brookman <justin@cdt.org>, "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
I think the desire though is that DNT is a representation of a user's
explicit preference. If a browser set it by default, for instance, would a
site be obligated to respect it?


On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:33 PM, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com>wrote:

> I don't see the parity here. One is a user's affirmative action being
> overruled by another entity.  The other is the user opting to change a
> default setting.
> Lauren Gelman
> BlurryEdge Strategies
> 415-627-8512
> On May 30, 2012, at 3:22 PM, Shane Wiley wrote:
> Justin,****
> ** **
> If companies are expected to achieve “informed and explicit” consent to
> turn off DNT, then it is only fair that User Agents also achieve “informed
> and explicit” consent to turn on DNT.  Do you disagree?****
> ** **
> - Shane****
> ** **
> *From:* Justin Brookman [mailto:justin@cdt.org]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 30, 2012 3:17 PM
> *To:* public-tracking@w3.org
> *Subject:* Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user
> agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]****
> ** **
> What problem?  You honor the header by doing what the spec says.  There is
> no need for you to try to discern user intent, and indeed, no way for you
> to do so.  Ad networks cannot be and are not expected to be responsible for
> every UI or every possible bit of misinformation someone saw in a comment
> thread on Reddit to get them to turn on DNT in the first place.
> Today, if someone sets their browser to block third-party cookies, you
> don't try to circumvent that on the theory that someone maybe didn't
> understand what cookies did in the first place.  Nor do we dictate to the
> user agents how and when to surface and describe those capabilities.
> If there are conflicting headers, that's a different issue, and Ian and
> Jonathan are putting together draft text on that issue.
> ****
> Justin Brookman****
> Director, Consumer Privacy****
> Center for Democracy & Technology****
> 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100****
> Washington, DC 20006****
> tel 202.407.8812****
> fax 202.637.0969****
> justin@cdt.org****
> http://www.cdt.org****
> @CenDemTech****
> @JustinBrookman****
> On 5/30/2012 3:34 PM, Chris Mejia wrote:****
> I believe new Issue-150 is closely related to open Issue-143. If the
> user's intent in turning on/off DNT is not clear (especially in cases where
> the user doesn't even know they are specifically sending a DNT:1 header),
> there is no way for publishers to understand how to accurately "honor" any
> consumer's DNT header flag— *it's a fundamental flaw with this scope of
> this proceeding*.  I laid out the concern in some detail in my previous
> email to the group ("In Support of Issue-143"); so I'll just give the brief
> version here: if publishers do not understand the context of the user's DNT
> expression (was the user properly informed about what setting does/means,
> before it was set) how are publishers to determine what the user actually
> intended, or if they user is even aware that a DNT flag is being sent?  If
> any question/statement in any UI can lead to the sending of DNT:1 or DNT:0,
> where is the integrity of the system/solution?  ****
> ** **
> To give just one example (there are many) of how a DNT mechanism that
> lacks a uniform informed consent requirement might be abused, consider the
> theoretical yet plausible scenario where an email is sent to (millions of)
> users informing the users that they should "*click here to prevent evil
> doers from knowing who you are*" or even worse, "*click here if you think
> blue is a pretty color*" (replace with a variety of malware tactics), the
> user's click leading to a programatic setting of DNT, without the user's
> informed consent under uniform compliance rules.  When that happens (some
> zealot decides to abuse the system), I'm sure we'll eventually learn about
> it, after some amount of damage being done. ****
> ** **
> *When it becomes known that users were deceived into sending a DNT
> expression (no uniform informed consent), here's what the end-game of
> publishers might be: * without a way of discerning how DNT was set (which
> program; who owns the program; being able to inspect the program), and
> under which auspices it was set (what did the user agree to when they
> clicked?), when learning of a set of users who were deceived into setting
> DNT, publishers may be forced to consider if they should honor any DNT
> header requests at all, in an effort to protect the web experience of all
> users.  Under this scenario, publishers may be compelled to issue public
> statements outlining the fatal flaws of this W3C DNT mechanism, citing the
> specific abuses, and walking away from compliance on the grounds that being
> "compliant" with such a system would be harmful to the majority of its
> users.****
> ** **
> Is that really the result that this working group is looking for?  If not,
> I strongly suggest that we all get on board with defining a system where
> the actual intent of the user is absolutely clear— the only way I can think
> to accomplish this is to require compliance with a uniform requirement to
> properly educate/inform the user about their choice, at the point user
> choice is made.  Of course I'm open to hearing other suggestions for
> solving this problem, but I feel that "*it's out of scope/Charter for
> this project*" is not an acceptable solution— that answer does not solve
> the problem described here and in open Issue-143.  Please, let's solve the
> actual problem.****
> ** **
> Chris Mejia, IAB/DAA****
> ** **
> ** **
> On 5/30/12 1:35 PM, "Tracking Protection Working Group Issue Tracker" <
> sysbot+tracker@w3.org> wrote:****
> ** **
> tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user agents [Tracking
> Definitions and Compliance]****
> ** **
> http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/150****
> ** **
> Raised by: Aleecia McDonald****
> On product: Tracking Definitions and Compliance****
> ** **
> Due to multiple addons that support Do Not Track, there could be
> conflicts. For example, a user could turn off DNT (not unset, actually off,
> sending DNT:0) in Firefox, yet install Abine's "Do Not Track Plus" addon
> (which sends DNT:1). More fun, users could have three different addons,
> each with a different value. Do we have either best practices or
> requirements for user agents here?****
> ** **
> Created from original issue-148, with actions taken by ifette and jmayer
> to write proposals.****
> ** **
> ** **
> ** **
> ** **
Received on Wednesday, 30 May 2012 23:05:59 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Friday, 17 January 2020 17:38:42 UTC