RE: No Standard Semantic Web Pragmatics?

Thanks, this makes everything clear (for the moment). It occurs to me that the "legal commitment" is part of a context which may lie outside of RDF or OWL - perhaps, for example, it's a WSDL issue.

James

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jim Hendler [mailto:hendler@cs.umd.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 10:58 PM
> To: Lynn, James (Software Services); John Black; Pat Hayes
> Cc: Sandro Hawke; Peter F. Patel-Schneider; public-sw-meaning@w3.org
> Subject: RE: No Standard Semantic Web Pragmatics?
> 
> 
> At 13:41 -0400 6/17/04, Lynn, James (Software Services) wrote:
> >Jim,
> >
> >Just to make sure I understand your position regarding this, can you 
> >tell me or give an example of how I would know, or even be 
> >relatively sure, whether someone is making an observation about a 
> >statement or accepting that statment in what some might call a 
> >legally binding manner. The statement "I agree with these terms and 
> >conditions" comes to mind, but use your own example if you wish? 
> >Does this statement enter into a legal contract? Is this simply a 
> >matter of using the correct definition of the word "agree" as in 
> >legally_binding:agree vs. myopinion: agree?
> >
> >Thanks,
> >
> >James Lynn
> 
> 
> James - there are times when saying that does indeed cause me to 
> enter a contract, but there's times it doesn't -- and the words 
> themselves (separate from the social context they appear in) can 
> never tell me which it is.  So I just don't believe we can create a 
> "syntactic" way to tell these things apart -- given that, what is a 
> different choice?  It's kind of a "client decide" mode -- i.e. a 
> search engine may not care, a legal aid agent will try to determine, 
> a contracting agent will insist that some extra stuff, outside the 
> simple context (i.e. something more than "is it on the page" -- maybe 
> something like "is it on the page in a form that matches a previous 
> agreement of how such legally binding pages will be represented and 
> containing a trusted key signed by one of the people i have 
> previously negotiated my online contracting with or authorized to 
> serve as an authorization proxy for me" )  Strangely, experience 
> would seem to show that in some ways these more complex things are 
> actually "simpler" in a certain sense.  That is, the phrase "I do" 
> doesn't commit you to a legal contract outside of the context of 
> being in response to a certain question asked by someone who has been 
> certified by a legal authority (usualy the State) to represent them 
> in this kind of contracting - which makes it a lot easier to tell a 
> real marriage from a couple of kids fooling around on the sandlot -- 
> okay, so what has this got to do with the Sem Web?  Well, I guess I 
> would like to see a situation something like "If I produce a semantic 
> web document (or any variant thereof that is parsable), and place it 
> on the Semantic Web,  you are entitled to believe I has created those 
> triples on the Semantic Web, and nothing more."  If, based on some 
> other, non SW context, or some prearranged or authorized other 
> context there is an expected social agreement, than I should make 
> that clear in a human readable form, or in a form for which some body 
> with "social clout" has determined should have a greater meeting 
> (for example a Creative Commons license).   Thus, I'd argue that a 
> Creative Commons license becomes meaningful by dint of being a CC 
> license (and there being a recongizable way to tell), not by dint of 
> being some random triples in RDF.
>   Now, all that said, I would argue that some minimal levels of 
> agreements could produce the necessary 80% needed for this thing to 
> grow and thrive (Since very few sites will need the RDF to be 
> "legally binding" in any sense).  So, for example, I would like to 
> see something that says (better than this) that if I create a 
> document that uses a relation defined on another document (and named 
> via a URI), then it is expected that the named document is 
> dereferencible if the document uses RDFS or OWL terminology  and, I 
> would probably be willing to consider the things implied by that 
> document (under the RDFS and OWL semantics) to be the same as above 
> (i.e. that you are entitled to believe that I am pointing at a 
> document containing those triples and nothing more barring social 
> agreement)
>   So, what do I think is our job?  Identifying some of these minimal 
> social conventions that will help make this work better.  What do I 
> want us to avoid?   Arguing philosophical issues about "meaning" and 
> "intent" which have no impact and don't bring us forward in any way
>   -JH
> 
> 
> >
> >>  -----Original Message-----
> >>  From: public-sw-meaning-request@w3.org
> >>  [mailto:public-sw-meaning-request@w3.org]On Behalf Of Jim Hendler
> >>  Sent: Thursday, June 17, 2004 1:29 PM
> >>  To: John Black; Pat Hayes
> >>  Cc: Sandro Hawke; Peter F. Patel-Schneider; 
> public-sw-meaning@w3.org
> >>  Subject: RE: No Standard Semantic Web Pragmatics?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  John - somehow in all this mess below you've missed my 
> key point -- I
> >>  don't care whether putting something in RDF counts as 
> asserting it or
> >>  not --  here, let me try this:
> >>
> >>
> >>  Hendler's postulate:  Creating content on the Web in an 
> RDF document,
> >>  or equivalent graph store, is exactly equivalent in terms 
> of speech
> >>  act theory to creating content on the web in HTNL, XHTML 
> or any other
> >>  machine readable format.
> >>
> >>  There, now based on Hendler's postulate, I can ignore 90% of the
> >>  discussion on this list -- it's that other 10% which 
> seems to me to
> >>  get past the philosophical nonsense and get to what I 
> care about --
> >>  is there some way I can use pointers in one document to 
> pointers in
> >>  another,  coupled with various tools (including inference and
> >>  reasoning engines) to exploit the content placed there in 
> some useful
> >>  way, perhaps with a set of social conventions that work 
> most of the
> >>  time without being driven to uselessness if some pathological use
> >>  occurs (like someone claiming to be a divine being)
> >>
> >>  To put it another way, I would like the speech act stuff 
> to be up to
> >>  the client to determine in whatever idiosyncratic way it 
> wishes, but
> >>  we could have some social conventions that make that 
> easier, and are
> >>  usually useful.
> >>    -JH
> >>  p.s. I wanted to rename this to break the thread into separable
> >>  pieces, but Icouldn't actually come up with a better name...
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  At 11:38 -0400 6/17/04, John Black wrote:
> >>  >>From: Jim Hendler
> >>  >>Sent: Wednesday, June 16, 2004 5:59 PM
> >>  >
> >>  >>At 9:43 -0400 6/16/04, John Black wrote:
> >>  >>>>  From: Jim Hendler
> >>  >>>>  Sent: Monday, June 14, 2004 7:07 PM
> >>  >>>>
> >>  >>>>  >>However, another key idea grew about the same time --
> >>  as long as we
> >>  >>>>  >>are using URIs, we could make those URIs
> >>  dereferencable -- that is,
> >>  >>>>  >>we could look and see if there is a document 
> there, and if so,
> >>  >>>>  >>perhaps that document could describe the link -- 
> RDFS and OWL
> >>  >>>>  >>provide vocabularies that live at those links and provide
> >>  >>>>  >>information about the "intent" of those relationships.
> >>  >>>>  >
> >>  >>>>  >No, that is exactly what they do not provide. That is
> >>  John's point:
> >>  >>>>  >there is a gap here precisely because the SW notations
> >>  only express
> >>  >>>>  >CONTENT, they do not express INTENTION.  The stuff about
> >>  >>>>  >performatives in the paper I helped write was intended
> >>  to be a step
> >>  >>>>  >towards bridging this gap, since performatives in
> >>  natural language
> >>  >>>>  >are exactly where an intention is expressed
> >>  unambiguously by stating
> >>  >>>>  >- describing - the intention. If enough people say
> >>  that Jack and
> >>  >>>>  >Jill are married, in the right way and under the right
> >>  >>>>  >circumstances, then they are married. If I say "I
> >>  promise to buy you
> >>  >>>>  >lunch" then an actual promise got created: I performed
> >>  a social act
> >>  >>>>  >by saying that I was performing it. Very handy, that
> >>  is: it gets you
> >>  >>>>  >from mere descriptions (which we indubitably have in
> >>  RDF and OWL) to
> >>  >>>>  >actual intentional actions: it gets assertings
> >>  (denials, explicit
> >>  >>>>  >non-assertings, endorsements, whatever) actually 
> done, and in a
> >>  >>>>  >publicly checkable way rather than being left implicit.
> >>  >>>>
> >>  >>>>  Ah, right right right -- I knew you logician types have
> >>  this bug up
> >>  >>>>  your butts about "intent" -- and that is why I put 
> it in scare
> >>  >>>>  quotes, but I should have made it even clear i was
> >>  using the term in
> >>  >>>>  an informal and not a technical sense -- however, that
> >>  said,I think
> >>  >>>>  it is this hangup with "intent" somehow being a
> >>  mysterious thing that
> >>  >>>>  is largely to blame for our lack of progress on this
> >>  social meaning
> >>  >>>>  stuff
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>Could you please elaborate on this attribution of blame to
> >>  "this hang-up
> >>  >>>with 'intent'"? I'm really curious about this. Since it is
> >>  my intention
> >>  >>>to achieve progress on this issue, I don't want to 
> stumble into a
> >>  >>>position where I am to blame for the lack of it. (You
> >>  could leave out
> >>  >>>the scatological ad hominem attacks and slurs against 
> professional
> >>  >>>groups unless you think that is critical to your point)
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>the ad hominen attacks aren't crucial, but the email gets
> >>  really boring
> >>  >>without them...
> >>  >>
> >>  >>>>  Consider, if you go to my HTML web page you will see a
> >>  link to a page
> >>  >>>>  that has pictures of my daughter.  You have no way to
> >>  know what my
> >>  >>>>  intent was in putting them there -- you can guess at some
> >>  >>>>  possibilities (wrong, I was not trying to raise the
> >>  price that would
> >>  >>>>  be offered for her on the black market) but you can't
> >>  know what I had
> >>  >>>>  in mind.  If I had labeled those photos in RDF, OWL, or
> >>  KIF there is
> >>  >>>>  no reason why I would have told you one whit more about
> >>  my intent --
> >>  >>>>  I might have made it unambiguous that I was averring
> >>  that the person
> >>  >>>>  depicted in the photograph was one with whom I had 
> the familiar
> >>  >>>>  relationship of type daughter -- but you still 
> wouldn't have any
> >>  >>>>  intent behind it.
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>Well to the extent that I don't know what your intent was
> >>  you didn't
> >>  >>>communicate. There is nothing wrong with that. Its 
> sounds like what
> >>  >>>you intended. I can still view the pictures.
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>the point is you can view the pictures with no idea of why
> >>  I put them
> >>  >>there - which is what I was after
> >>  >
> >>  >But that supports my point, the web is used for many 
> good things that
> >>  >have nothing to do with assertion of truth values, so it is
> >>  false that
> >>  >every page asserts the truth functional propositional value
> >>  of its content.
> >>  >Say now you want to post some RDF and assert it. How do 
> I know the
> >>  >difference? Suppose your intent, whatever that was, in
> >>  posting this RDF
> >>  >page, was the same as it was for your daughters 
> pictures? Could be,
> >>  >right? You don't say so I can't tell. There seems to be an
> >>  unspecified
> >>  >assumption that, when it matters, when you do want to assert
> >>  your RDF,
> >>  >it will somehow be obvious. Now who is depending on telepathic
> >>  >transmission of intention?
> >>  >
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>But I disagree with you that I cannot recognize your 
> intent if you
> >>  >>>take pains to communicate it to me. Nor am I talking about any
> >>  >>>mysterious supernatural mind-melding, telepathy, or otherwise
> >>  >>>peering into the interiority of your consciousness. No, I am
> >>  >>>talking about one of the most extraordinary properties of human
> >>  >>>communication, "...If I am trying to tell someone 
> something, then
> >>  >>>(assuming certain conditions are satisfied) as soon as he
> >>  recognizes
> >>  >>>that I am trying to tell him something and exactly 
> what it is I am
> >>  >>>trying to tell him, I have succeeded in telling it to him.
> >>  Furthermore,
> >>  >>>unless he recognizes that I am trying to tell him
> >>  something and what
> >>  >>>I am trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling
> >>  it to him."
> >>  >>>-John R. Searle, Speech Acts, p.47
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>I'll work off of this, although I should mention that early
> >>  in my career
> >>  >>I wrote several things (published in long lost workshop
> >>  proceedings I
> >>  >>suspect) that argued with the above - Searle's stuff
> >>  ignored some pragmatic
> >>  >>issues IMHO  -- in particular, the last sentence of the
> >>  above is one I
> >>  >>disagree with - but it's not really germane to this 
> discussion...
> >>  >>
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>And again using "intention" explicitly, "In speaking I 
> attempt to
> >>  >>>communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him 
> to recognize
> >>  >>>my intention to communicate just those things. I achieve
> >>  the intended
> >>  >>>effect on the hearer by getting him to recognize my 
> intention to
> >>  >>>achieve that effect, and as soon as the hearer recognizes
> >>  what it is
> >>  >>>my intention to achieve, it is in general achieved. He 
> understands
> >>  >>>what I am saying as soon as he recognizes my intention 
> in uttering
> >>  >>>what I utter as an intention to say that thing."
> >>  >>>-John R. Searle, Speech Acts, p.43
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>again, can't you understand what is on my web page in 
> ways I may not
> >>  >>have anticipated without knowing what my intent was on 
> putting them
> >>  >>there?
> >>  >
> >>  >Of course I can. I compare it to this. I like to take my 4
> >>  year old son
> >>  >to the mall so he can play in the playground. While there, I
> >>  like to watch
> >>  >people. Being a portrait artist in a previous career, I like
> >>  to observe
> >>  >the behavior and faces of the people I see. I observe them
> >>  talking and
> >>  >gesturing to each other. They are not communicating with me,
> >>  and that's fine.
> >>  >And the web can be used for other acts besides communication
> >>  as well, and
> >>  >I can go on line and watch people engage in web posting acts
> >>  and learn
> >>  >things from it and so on. What I'm getting at is, when do I
> >>  know to start
> >>  >treating RDF posting as an assertion of the propositions it
> >>  contains? How
> >>  >am I supposed to know what counts as a speech act and not
> >>  just another
> >>  >web posting act?
> >>  >
> >>  >I believe you are arguing my position. So tell Sandro and
> >>  Peter and Dan
> >>  >that posting something on the web is not by default a truth
> >>  functional
> >>  >assertion. Sometimes its just posting behavior. Who 
> knows what for.
> >>  >And I can come closer to Sandro's position here. I can 
> observe your
> >>  >RDF-posting behavior as well, without taking it to count as
> >>  communication,
> >>  >or even knowing if it should. I can even analyze or 
> reason with the
> >>  >propositions contained in the artifacts of your 
> RDF-posting behavior
> >>  >without taking them to count as yours or anyone's 
> statements for that
> >>  >matter. Now I am really close to Sandro's position. But my
> >>  point is that
> >>  >I can't take that last step, of knowing that now, these 
> propositions
> >>  >do count as a communication of the assertion of the
> >>  propositions of that
> >>  >RDF by a certain person. And when it matters, it matters. If it
> >>  >doesn't matter, it doesn't matter - and I don't care either.
> >>  >
> >>  >And I think that there should be a simple, easy, standard, out of
> >>  >the box way to make that intention clear.
> >>  >
> >>  >However, your argument below, which I will take the liberty of
> >>  >paraphrasing as 'do it with code for now and maybe we can make it
> >>  >declarative later', which, if that's what your saying, at least
> >>  >acknowledges that there may be something here that needs 
> to be done.
> >>  >So I'll stop for now and go back to writing code - lots and lots
> >>  >of it - and hope that my code works together with everyone elses.
> >>  >
> >>  >>It's unclear to me how much Searle's Speech Act theory really
> >>  >>relates to human interaction on the Web (let alone agent
> >>  interaction)
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>>  So if we simply can argue w/respect to what the links
> >>  state (in the
> >>  >>>  factual sense) and attribute their ownership based on
> >>  where they are
> >>  >>>  asserted (oops, I mean where the bit stream defining
> >>  them is found -
> >>  >>>  since assertion is another bug up the arse) - then
> >>  perhaps we could
> >>  >>>  have made some useful progress on stating "what's in a link"
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>
> >>  >>>  >>And technically, that is the heart of the Semantic Web
> >>  architecture
> >>  >>>  >>- links that can be named and described more formally.
> >>  >>>  >>
> >>  >>>  >>IMO, the social meaning issue arises from the fact 
> that we have
> >>  >>>  >>both referencing and dereferecing going on.  When 
> links share a
> >>  >>>  >>URI, and there's no document at that URI to
> >>  dereference, then it is
> >>  >>>  >>clear that any meaning of that term is in some 
> sort of off-line
> >>  >>>  >>"Social" conventions between the users thereof.
> >>  However, when we
> >>  >>>  >>add the dereferencing it becomes trickier -- because
> >>  now we have to
> >>  >>>  >>ask if use of the term in some way "commits" to 
> what is in the
> >>  >>>  >>dereferencing document, if the owner of that document
> >>  controls the
> >>  >>>  >>use of the term, etc.
> >>  >>>  >>
> >>  >>>  >>There's lots of other "social meaning" issues on the
> >>  Semantic Web,
> >>  >>>  >>and the threads on this list talk about many of 
> them, but in my
> >>  >>>  >>mind the key ones are those that arise from the 
> issue of the
> >>  >>>  >>relation between the named terms and the documents
> >>  that describe,
> >>  >>>  >>in some formal way, the use of those terms
> >>  >>>  >
> >>  >>>  >Well, yes, but (IMO) only because such dereferencing is
> >>  the only way
> >>  >>>  >to establish any kind of link between a URI and
> >>  anything that can be
> >>  >>>  >plausibly attributed agency. In order for a promise 
> (etc) to be
> >>  >>>  >done, there has to be an agent doing the promising.
> >>  Similarly for
> >>  >>>  >asserting, denying, etc. . Without agents (and I 
> really do mean
> >>  >>>  >SOCIAL agents, not software agents) in the picture, all
> >>  we have is
> >>  >>>  >sentences being looked at: nothing is asserted at all.
> >>  >>
> >>  >>>And I would add, defining and naming. Unless we also 
> have an agent
> >>  >>>acting with the intent and authority to define or 
> name, all we have
> >>  >>>is even more sentences. Without it, we are stuck in a 
> room with a
> >>  >>>Chinese/Chinese dictionary, trying to ground our symbols in an
> >>  >>>endless series of more symbols. I really think this may be the
> >>  >>>Grand Synthesis I predicted in our last telecon. We have
> >>  been thinking
> >>  >>>of URI dereferencing as being a means of adding in more formal>
> >>  >>>propositions and descriptions to our groundless lists. Instead,
> >>  >>>URI dereferencing could be the source of AGENCY, INTENTION, AND
> >>  >>>AUTHORITY that really could be the basis of an automated
> >>  communication
> >>  >>>system with reasoning.
> >>  >>
> >>  >>
> >>  >>the ad hominen attacks above were largely aimed at the 
> stuff you are
> >>  >>quoting now, and thus I will not respond - if I can't say
> >>  something nice
> >>  >>about Searle's >Chinese room <expletive deleted> I can't
> >>  say anything at
> >>  >>all.
> >>  >
> >>  >>that is - I'd claim any machine that could do what Searle
> >>  claims in less
> >>  >>than infinite time would have to understand Chinese -- and
> >>  I'd claim that
> >>  >>we can get the same sort of pragmatic effcts on the web
> >>  without having to
> >>  >>deal with Agency, intention and authority -- should be
> >>  noted that I am the
> >>  >>ultimate "scruffy" in this, and that Pat has already 
> dealt me some
> >>  >>devastating blows in his response to my message (and I've
> >>  decided to
> >>  >>ignore them, rather than deal with them as Pat and I have
> >>  been having
> >>  >>this discussion on and off for going on twenty years now
> >>  and I cannot
> >>  >>remember how I refuted them last time :->)
> >>  >
> >>  >>
> >>  >>>However, I don't want to alarm anyone with this word,
> >>  AUTHORITY, with
> >>  >>>its connotations of condign power and all. So I came up with a
> >>  >>>replacement, UNDERWRITER. To say your terms are underwritten by
> >>  >>>an impressive agent would be to say that agent 
> provides a warranty
> >>  >>>promising to compensate you if you use a term they have
> >>  underwritten
> >>  >>>to mean one thing and you lose money because someone 
> misunderstands
> >>  >>>you to mean something else. It gives a whole new 
> meaning to Humpty
> >>  >>>Dumpty's strategy to have his words mean what he pays 
> them to mean.
> >>  >>>That said, I am completely serious about this.
> >>  >>
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  >>look, I understand a lot of this stuff - and if I have 
> heard this
> >>  >>argument that if we want agents to be at the heart of 
> e-commerce,
> >>  >>trust will be required -- but I also stick my ATM card into bank
> >>  >>machines that have access to my real money, and which 
> give me real
> >>  >>money, and I know that they have no model of Agency, 
> intention, and
> >>  >>authority/underwriting in any real sense -- there's a 
> set of human
> >>  >>social agreements with all these things that are enforced by the
> >>  >>infrastructure, and tested by trusted entities (the 
> banks) to where
> >>  >>I am willing to trust them.  If I find an arbitrary web 
> site that
> >>  >>says Peter is a perfect being, then more fool me if I believe it
> >>  >>(but it's perfectly fine if I stick it into my crawler 
> results so
> >>  >>that when someone asks "perfect being" I return pointers to that
> >>  >>page among all the others).
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  >>In short, I realize what I am really arguing for is some sort of
> >>  >>operational semantics of this stuff that makes some 
> sense to us as
> >>  >>humans, works well enough in practice for us to build 
> systems out
> >>  >>of, and someday can perhaps be formalized as an interesting new
> >>  >>means of human-machine interaction.  There's a nice example of
> >>  >>that in something called "programming langauges" where 
> operational
> >>  >>semantics have gotten us pretty danged far.
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  >>So put me down as a pragmatist over a Searlean (even if 
> I do tend
> >>  >>towards the Surly)
> >>  >
> >>  >>>  well, we humans seem to be social agents who handle this
> >>  assertional
> >>  >>>  stuff just fine - we know how to differentiate (at least in
> >>  >>>  principle) between "what Pat said" and "What I think Pat
> >>  meant" - and
> >>  >>>  we usually conditionalize the latter in civil discourse
> >>  -- seems to
> >>  >>>  me our Sem Web agents could do the same and we could 
> move on to
> >>  >>>  actually looking at this use of dereferencable URIs as
> >>  something that
> >>  >>>  could add a lot of power to the SW if we had some social
> >>  >>>  conventions/expectations.
> >>  >
> >>  >
> >>  >>so replace "semantic conventions/expectations" with "operational
> >>  >>semantics" and you'll see what I've been saying is actually a
> >>  >>relatively consistent position
> >>  >>  -JH
> >>  >>p.s. and if you want to see what I think the basis of 
> operational
> >>  >>semantics for this stuff might be, go back to my early messages
> >>  >>about URIs and dereferencing in this group
> >>  >-- cf
> >>  http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-sw-meaning/2003Sep/
> >0050.html
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>   (i.e. I claim I am legitimized to believe that Peter 
> believes that he
> >>>>   is a perfect being by dint of stating it on his page 
> -- I may be
> >>>>   wrong, but then I'm usually wrong about what Peter believes, so
> >>>>   what's different about this?)
> >>
> >>
> >>>--
> >>
> >>>Professor James Hendler 
> >>>http://www.cs.umd.edu/users/hendler
> >>>Director, Semantic Web and Agent Technologies       301-405-2696
> >>>Maryland Information and Network Dynamics Lab.      
> 301-405-6707 (Fax)
> >>>Univ of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742      240-277-3388 (Cell)
> >>
> >
> >--
> >Professor James Hendler 
> >http://www.cs.umd.edu/users/hendler
> >Director, Semantic Web and Agent Technologies	  301-405-2696
> >Maryland Information and Network Dynamics Lab.	  
> 301-405-6707 (Fax)
> >Univ of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742	  240-277-3388 (Cell)
> 
> -- 
> Professor James Hendler			  
http://www.cs.umd.edu/users/hendler
Director, Semantic Web and Agent Technologies	  301-405-2696
Maryland Information and Network Dynamics Lab.	  301-405-6707 (Fax)
Univ of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742	  240-277-3388 (Cell)

Received on Tuesday, 22 June 2004 16:58:02 UTC