Re: TLS certificate verification policy?

On 2014-11-08 19:34, Owen Shepherd wrote:
> WebFinger does not mandate CA verification. It mandates certificate 
> verification. This does not necessarily require CAs as the trust roots.

My bad. Nevertheless, it effectively excludes (today) anything that is
not the CA system since just about every implementation will validate
against the Mozilla CA list or similar. So Monkeysphere, self-signed
etc. cannot compete at the same level as friends of too-big-to-fail
companies like Verisign or Comodo.

> I think it is important for us to require HTTPS and validation. We need not 
> specify the mechanism of validation.

If we don't define a validation procedure but _do_ require validation it
will cause confusion and incompatibility. I'd gladly see the protocol
specification _allow_ for certificate validation but not forcefully
require it.

Nodes in the network which want to explicitly validate TLS certs
according to their preferred threat models or company policies can do
so. If they want, they can integrate some feedback to their users about
which other nodes are operating with non-validated services or simply
not interoperate.

Just my 2 cents.

--
Mikael Nordfeldth
XMPP/mail: mmn@hethane.se

Received on Saturday, 8 November 2014 20:22:49 UTC