- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 08:00:44 -0700
- To: Emmanuel Revah <stsil@manurevah.com>
- Cc: "public-restrictedmedia@w3.org" <public-restrictedmedia@w3.org>
Sent from my iPhone On May 20, 2013, at 4:31 AM, Emmanuel Revah <stsil@manurevah.com> wrote: > On 2013/05/19 19:32, Mark Watson wrote: >> Sent from my iPhone > > Sent from my iStronglyUrgeAllSupportersToReconsiderTheEmeProposal > > > >> It would certainly be bad if services like Netflix were available only >> in Chrome and IE and not in Firefox. > > Bad for who, Netflix or Firefox ? (or both ?). *Users* of both Netflix and Firefox. And so, by extension, both. > > > > >> What do you think the W3C should >> do to help avoid that outcome ? > > Wrong question, it should be: What do you think Netflix should do to keep their business running ? That's our problem, surely. Anyway, we think EME is the best way forward for users of our service and making things better for users of the service is good for the business. > > So far the answer has been: Pressure the W3C to standardise a mechanism to control the user's browser, I prefer to think of it as a mechanism to allow users to give control of very specific aspects of media handling to a service provided, if they choose to do so. *Plugins* are a mechanism to give control of the whole browser to someone else. We're trying to improve on plugins. > instead of: Pressure "the Hollywood" to trust identified clients who pay for access with their credit cards because they find it more practical than DVDs or "piracy" to not abuse their account privileges. > > > Why should the users you* do not trust place their trust in you (and your choice of CDM vendor) ? > First, we're asking them to trust their browser's choice of CDM vendor. This is better than giving them no choice of plugin vendor, as happens today. Second, I addressed the idea that this is an affront to ordinary users earlier in the thread. Modest security measures are not generally considered an affront even when they are inconvenient to ordinary users. Users understand that there are a minority of people who want to get stuff without paying. Now, you can reasonably argue that the measures are disproportionate to the threat. There are plenty of examples where people go too far with security measures, causing too much inconvenience to those who are not in fact a threat. But it makes no sense in such cases to argue that, therefore, there should be no security measures. ...Mark > > > > -- > Emmanuel Revah > http://manurevah.com > >
Received on Monday, 20 May 2013 15:01:18 UTC