Re: [GRAPHS] g-box - abstraction or concrete?

Nathan wrote:
> Moving on to the next question that arises,
> 
> Sandro Hawke wrote:
>> 1.  A "g-box" is a container, like a "set" data structure in
>> programming.  It holds some RDF arcs, with their nodes. (Alternatively,
>> it holds some RDF triples.).  G-boxes can overlap, sharing some of the
>> same nodes and arcs.  Two g-boxes can happen to have the same contents
>> (right now) while being distinct g-boxes. G-boxes contents can change:
>> today a particular g-box might contain the triples { my:a my:b _:x.
>> my:a my:c _:x }, and tomorrow it might instead contain { my:a my:b _:x.
>> my:a my:c2 _:x }.
> ...
>> * A g-box can exist without any name or persistent way of referring to
>>   it; it can exist as a data structure in a running program, or I
>>   suppose it can exists in someone's mind.  Long-lived g-boxes
>>   probably SHOULD be given a preferred single working URL, but there
>>   might be times when you do don't want to give it any, or when you
>>   want to give it several URLs.
> 
> is a g-box a platonic abstraction or a concrete realisation then, as 
> soon as you give a g-box a name, and duplicate it such that there are 
> two copies both bearing the same name(s) that need synchronized, then 
> does the g-box also become a platonic abstraction?
> 
> It appears to me that we have an idealized platonic abstraction here 
> (named g-box), and then concrete realizations of those g-box's where 
> their state is managed by processes via some abstract protocol which is 
> (partially) materialized in various concrete protocols which manage the 
> state of these abstract-g-box-shadows via messages / representations.
> 
> Real world example being a named-g-box which is replicated in two or 
> more places.
> 
> Discussions?

a g-box is a container of statements which form a particular view of a 
subset of the universe of discourse, the container is stateful such that 
it (potentially) contains different statements over time, at any one 
time the statements in the container form a set which can be considered 
the current state of that container (g-snap) and they form a current 
view of a the particular subset of the universe of discourse which they 
describe.

A g-box is a stateful abstraction whose state is managed by an abstract 
protocol, the abstract protocol is realized via various machine 
protocols which manage the state of the g-box via messages and pass full 
or partial representations of the current state (g-snap) in various 
lexical forms (g-texts).

A g-box can be given a name, and when a g-box is given a name the name 
becomes a namespace since the g-box is a container, and this namespace 
serves as the scope for all things within the g-box 
(statements/names/nodes). Thus a named-g-box becomes an Aristotelian 
abstraction where the current state of that named-g-box forms a 
particular scoped view of subset of the universe of discourse.

Since a g-box is an abstraction, it cannot be duplicated or replicated 
(I'm tempted to say a g-box is a Platonic abstraction and a named g-box 
is an Aristotelian abstraction), however two g-box's can share the same 
name(s) and machine protocols can be used to try and synchronize the 
current state of the g-box's sharing the same name such that they all 
offer the same view of the subset of the universe of discourse which 
they describe. This process can be seen as forking a g-box at it's 
current state to create a new g-box with the same current-state 
(g-snap), then pulling/pushing changes to the state in order to keep 
them aligned and sharing the same view / saying the same thing.

make sense?

So, I'm starting to get a notion that almost everything in RDF is an 
abstraction which has a realization.. a g-box is an abstraction who's 
current state can be realized via a representation of that state (a 
g-text), a Statement could be seen as an abstraction which is realized 
with a Triple, literals could be seen as platonic abstractions which are 
realized in a lexical form, named and blank nodes can be seen as being 
ultra clever in that when scoped within a g-box they can be seen as 
platonic abstractions offering a particular world view of what they 
refer to (almost with closed world semantics being inside the closure of 
the g-box - with optional namespace), and when viewed from outside the 
box they can be seen as referring to aristotelian abstractions. Likewise 
statements can be seen like this too, scoped within the g-box they can 
have closed world assumptions, be contained by the box and within a 
particular view of the world, and outside the box they can be considered 
with open world assumptions and as comprising a subset of the 
description of some aristotelian abstraction for which their truth value 
must be established. I better stop here!

cheers,

Nathan

Received on Friday, 25 February 2011 20:50:17 UTC