- From: David Chadwick <d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk>
- Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2012 20:18:41 +0100
- To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
- CC: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>, "Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng)" <kwiereng@cisco.com>, "public-identity@w3.org" <public-identity@w3.org>, "public-philoweb@w3.org" <public-philoweb@w3.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>, "public-webid@w3.org" <public-webid@w3.org>, "public-privacy@w3.org" <public-privacy@w3.org>
Hi Ben I disagree. It depends upon your risk assessment. Your stand is like saying TLS should be the substrate, not http. There are two alternative viewpoints. You can either start with the lowest security/privacy and add to it, or make the highest security/privacy the default and then take from it. So you should not necessarily mandate that U-Prove/Idemix are the default tokens, but rather only require them if your risk assessment says privacy protection is essential regards David On 18/10/2012 16:34, Ben Laurie wrote: > On 9 October 2012 14:19, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote: >> Still in my conversations I have found that many people in security spaces >> just don't seem to be able to put the issues in context, and can get sidetracked >> into not wanting any linkability at all. Not sure how to fix that. > > You persist in missing the point, which is why you can't fix it. The > point is that we want unlinkability to be possible. Protocols that do > not permit it or make it difficult are problematic. I have certainly > never said that you should always be unlinked, that would be stupid > (in fact, I once wrote a paper about how unpleasant it would be). > > As I once wrote, anonymity should be the substrate. Once you have > that, you can the build on it to be linked when you choose to be, and > not linked when you choose not to be. If it is not the substrate, then > you do not have this choice. >
Received on Thursday, 18 October 2012 19:19:18 UTC