- From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2012 17:06:10 +0100
- To: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Cc: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>, "Klaas Wierenga (kwiereng)" <kwiereng@cisco.com>, "public-identity@w3.org" <public-identity@w3.org>, "public-philoweb@w3.org" <public-philoweb@w3.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>, "public-webid@w3.org" <public-webid@w3.org>, "public-privacy@w3.org" <public-privacy@w3.org>
On 18 October 2012 16:41, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote: > On 10/18/12 11:34 AM, Ben Laurie wrote: >> >> On 9 October 2012 14:19, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote: >>> >>> Still in my conversations I have found that many people in security >>> spaces >>> just don't seem to be able to put the issues in context, and can get >>> sidetracked >>> into not wanting any linkability at all. Not sure how to fix that. >> >> You persist in missing the point, which is why you can't fix it. The >> point is that we want unlinkability to be possible. Protocols that do >> not permit it or make it difficult are problematic. I have certainly >> never said that you should always be unlinked, that would be stupid >> (in fact, I once wrote a paper about how unpleasant it would be). >> >> As I once wrote, anonymity should be the substrate. Once you have >> that, you can the build on it to be linked when you choose to be, and >> not linked when you choose not to be. If it is not the substrate, then >> you do not have this choice. >> >> >> >> > > Do you have example of what you describe? By that question I mean: implicit > anonymity as a functional substrate of some realm that we experience today? That's what selective disclosure systems like U-Prove and the PRIME project are all about.
Received on Thursday, 18 October 2012 16:06:40 UTC