- From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
- Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2013 17:33:27 -0800
- To: Peter Thatcher <pthatcher@google.com>
- Cc: Bernard Aboba <Bernard.Aboba@microsoft.com>, public-orca@w3c.org
- Message-ID: <CABkgnnX1whX7NAskYHnL9S+2OFhjGbuX6QB7_c_e1DwPAhLs_Q@mail.gmail.com>
I'm increasingly of the opinion that the merits of adding a non-encrypted mode are less and less attractive. It's more work all round with marginal payoff. On Dec 26, 2013 11:07 AM, "Peter Thatcher" <pthatcher@google.com> wrote: > > > > On Sun, Dec 22, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Bernard Aboba < > Bernard.Aboba@microsoft.com> wrote: > >> On Fri, Dec 6, 2013 at 8:35 AM, Roman Shpount <rshpount@turbobridge.com >> >wrote: >> >> >> a) Would this allow plain RTP and SCTP? If we can wire plain >> transports, >> >> can we wire SCTP and RTP directly to ICE? >> >> >> >> Peter Thatcher replied: >> >> >I think the answer to that is "no" for browsers. DTLS would still be >> >required. Mobile apps and other endpoints could, of course, do whatever >> >they want. >> >> [BA] I agree that the answer should be "no" for the ORTC API as >> implemented in a browser. However, in a server scenario (e.g. node.js >> modules used to build a WebRTC-legacy gateway) or in a mobile application >> (e.g. "ortclib") it could be quite useful to be able to support >> unencrypted RTP or SRTP/SDES key exchange, possibly without ICE. >> >> To avoid confusion between the ORTC browser API and future server/mobile >> functionality, it is probably best to focus the current ORTC API spec and >> examples purely on the browser case. However, server requirements and >> functionality is something to keep in the back of our minds. > > >> Roman said: >> >> > b) There is a current discussion going on about changing ICE consent >> with >> > DTLS consent. How would this work in ORTC if DTLS is optional? >> >> Peter answered: >> >> > In general, ability to remove DTLS from the transport path would cause a >> > substantial security debate. It might be better to have ICE/DTLS >> transport >> > and provide new replacement transports in the future when they are >> > available and deemed secure. >> >> [BA] For browser uses, DTLS will always be required to protect SCTP as >> well as for DTLS/SRTP key exchange. But in a server scenario, one might >> want to enable an RTCRtpSender/Receiver object to have an rtpTransport >> attribute that represented an alternative transport. >> > > > I agree with all of that: DTLS required for browsers, but an API flexible > enough for new replacement transports in the future or different kinds of > transports for native/mobile/server apps. > >
Received on Friday, 27 December 2013 01:33:55 UTC