On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 8:21 PM, Nick Doty <npdoty@w3.org> wrote: > I'm not sure the situations are analogous. Large web sites that handle > credit card numbers or store personal information as part of their business > are likely aware of the security implications, more than a website > developer who once added a bit of JavaScript to take a user's picture. > And yet those sites routinely have breaches. > Ongoing surreptitious access to camera and microphone on someone's device > is potentially much more harmful to the user than access to her credit card > number and an annoying call with her bank's anti-fraud division. > This seems to reflect a fairly rosy view of the severity of financial fraud. What we're saying is that every XSS or related security bug you have in the > future, in addition to having security implications for your site's > business, will also expose every previous user of your site to video and > audio surveillance. It's not, "using this API involves sensitive data, so > audit to find security bugs when you're using it", but rather "if you ever > used this, you have to commit to perfect security diligence in perpetuity." > Well, again, not in Firefox, because Firefox doesn't persist permissions by default. > At the least, I think Mathieu's suggestion about CSP might be useful in > updating that section of the spec. We could give more specific > recommendations about use of CSP and maybe user agents can take that signal > into account when determining whether to grant a permission based on a > prior granting. > I don't have a problem with recommending that people use CSP, but I don't agree that it makes sense to require browsers to take that into account, at least at the time of grant use for the reason I indicated previously. -Ekr > On Oct 24, 2015, at 1:12 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > On the other hand, it's the advice we give to sites which handle credit > card numbers, e-mails, and other sensitive information. Generally, if > you once have an XSS on your site, it's fairly hard to clean up later. > > -Ekr > > On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:01 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On 23 October 2015 at 17:27, Nick Doty <npdoty@w3.org> wrote: >> > The current advice in the specification is for site developers that use >> the API not to have security vulnerabilities anywhere on their sites. That >> doesn't seem like advice that can or will be followed. >> >> Yes, I agree that this sort of advice is foolish. >> > > >Received on Tuesday, 27 October 2015 10:43:40 UTC
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