- From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
- Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2014 04:27:15 -0700
- To: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
- Cc: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "public-media-capture@w3.org" <public-media-capture@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CABcZeBO8iJmZyuLoC2dk3DMLzega=SPU3rJU+Tjm7_-xy3LAbQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Jun 1, 2014 at 11:13 PM, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no> wrote: > On 06/02/2014 05:04 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote: > > > > > On Tue, May 27, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On 27 May 2014 12:33, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no> wrote: >> > The discussion I heard at the Media Capture TF meeting was approximately >> > between two alternatives: >> > >> > 1) Permission persists until the device is released by all tracks >> sourced >> > from it. >> > >> > 2) Permission persists until the page is closed. (This may allow >> permissions >> > to survive a page reload.) >> >> The way we communicate with users is with indicators. From that >> perspective, either approach works. >> >> I tend to prefer the former. In the case where an application is >> granted access to camera 1, we don't want to also enable access to >> camera 2. I think that the latter implies a greater scope to consent >> than a single one-off interaction. >> >> I'd also like to keep this open to a degree of interpretation. Not >> all browsers will reach the same conclusions. Already, Chrome and >> Firefox are demonstrably different and I think that the current >> variation is within reasonable bounds. >> > > #2 seems to clearly violate the requirement that we only allow > persistent permissions when the page is loaded over HTTPS. > There are plenty of long-lived HTTP pages and it's not at all > OK to have them involve a long-lived permission after the > camera is closed. > > > That depends on the definition of "long-lived"; the interpretation I had > earlier was "long-lived" = "survives navigating away and coming back". > And how is that different from "persistent"? > Our recent Google-internal discussion about "reload" involves the > realization that reloading a HTTP resource doesn't seem to invite any > attack that couldn't be performed against the original connection - which > seems to indicate that while it's an expansion of the attack surface, it's > a small one. > > The argument in favour of "reload" is that users have been taught for a > while by state-keeping applicatios that "if anything goes wrong, hit reload > and it will sort itself out" - and inserting a new permission prompt in > that flow disrupts that illusion. > I'd like to see a precise description of what you're proposing here. -Ekr
Received on Monday, 2 June 2014 11:28:26 UTC