- From: Jan-Ivar Bruaroey <jib@mozilla.com>
- Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 19:37:18 -0500
- To: cowwoc <cowwoc@bbs.darktech.org>, public-media-capture@w3.org
- Message-ID: <52A11C3E.7000907@mozilla.com>
On 12/5/13 2:25 PM, cowwoc wrote: > If you read https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf > section 6.3 it explicitly states that "Fingerprintability is inversely > proportional to Debuggability". Uhm, no it doesn't. The closest actual quote I could find is: " Plugin and browser developers want the option of occasionally excavating the micro-version numbers of clients when trying to retrospectively diagnose some error that may be present in a particular micro-version of their code. This is an understandable desire, but it should now be clear that this decision trades off the user's privacy against the developer's convenience" Do you realize you're quoting from a polemic against fingerprinting? :-) > There is no getting around this fact. Any time we take steps to > protect against Fingerprinting we *will* suffer worse usability and > debuggability. You're conflating usability with debuggability. I find no mention of usability in the document. > Section 6.3 makes a very interesting point: "There is a spectrum > between extreme debuggability and extreme defense against > fingerprinting, and current browsers choose a point in that spectrum > close to the debuggability extreme. Perhaps this should change, > especially when users enter private browsing" modes. Thanks for making my point. Here's a direct quote from 'Conclusion': "Browser developers should also consider what they can do to reduce fingerprintability, particularly at the JavaScript API level." > Gili .: Jan-Ivar :.
Received on Friday, 6 December 2013 00:37:46 UTC