Re: Simple WebID, WebID+TLS Protocol, and ACL Dogfood Demo

On 9 August 2013 15:51, Hugh Glaser <hg@ecs.soton.ac.uk> wrote:

> This is great!
> Thanks guys.
> I normally really, really don't care about all that crypto stuff (it
> should all happen transparently), but I'm find all this interesting!
>
> So yes, I created a p12 (using http://id.myopenlink.net/certgen/ - you
> sometimes have to trust someone :-) ) and emailed.
> I am confident (!) that with Keychain things will be fine, but less sure
> about Windows.
> Opened it on a Windows box, and it seems to have taken the thing to heart
> and put it in some certificate management thing.
> I am a little uncertain what I should put at the URL (non-FOAF) I gave it
> - the final page gave me some options with micro data, RDFa etc - I am
> guessing I can just wrap any of them in <html><body> etc?
> Anyway, I can sort that.
>
> So now all (!!!) I really need to do is make my wordpress site look for
> the ID thing.
> Hmmm.
> Melvin, did you get any response to
> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webid/2012Aug/0041.html ?
> Or Kinglsey, what did you do on the server side of your photo?
>

I didnt get any feedback on wordpress.  However, Stéphane has written a
great mod for drupal:

http://drupal.org/project/webid

Since it's also PHP, I suspect it would not be too hard to repackage as a
wordpress plugin ...


> Cheers
>
> On 9 Aug 2013, at 13:25, Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com> wrote:
>
> > On 8/9/13 7:47 AM, Norman Gray wrote:
> >> Henry, greetings.
> >>
> >> [replying only on public-lod]
> >>
> >> Bit of an essay, this one, because I've been mulling this over, since
> this message appeared a couple of days ago...
> >>
> >> On 2013 Aug 8, at 16:14, Henry Story wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 7 Aug 2013, at 19:34, Nick Jennings <nick@silverbucket.net> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> 1. Certificate Name: maybe there could be some examples of ways to
> name your certificate.
> >> [...]
> >>> That's why it should be done by the server generating the certificate.
> >>> The details are here:
> >>>
> https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/WebID/raw-file/tip/spec/tls-respec.html#the-certificate
> >> I appreciate the logic here, and can see how it works technically
> smoothly for the anticipated use-case (the one illustrated in the WebID
> video on the webid.info front page).  I don't think that's enough,
> however, because I don't think I could convincingly explain what's
> happening here, to a motivated but non-technical friend who wants to
> understand what they've just achieved when I've walked them through getting
> their WebID certificate from (something like) the social service
> illustrated in the video.
> >>
> >> People understand what a username & password is (the first is my
> identity, the second is a secret that proves I am who I claim), and they
> understand what a door-key is (no identity, but I have this physical token
> which unlocks a barrier for anyone in possession of the token or a copy).
> >>
> >> The same is not true of a WebID.  Making this a one-click operation is
> nice (and a Good Thing at some level), but just means that the user knows
> that it was _this_ click that caused some black magic to happen, and I'm
> not sure that helps.
> >>
> >> Therefore...
> >>
> >>>> 2. With firefox, after filling out the form, I get a download
> dialogue for the cert instead of it installing into the browser. So I
> saved, then went into preferences and "import" ... which was successful
> with "Successfully restored your security certificate(s) and private
> key(s)". Previously, with my-profile.eu, this was automatically installed
> into the browser (I was using Chrome then). Though I guess it's better to
> have it export/save by default so you can install the same cert on any
> number of browsers without hassle. Still, it creates more steps and could
> be confusing for new users.
> >>> In the case of WebID certs downloading the certificate is in fact
> silly as you can produce a different one for each browser. So that message
> is a little
> >>> misleading. A good UI should warn the user about that.
> >> Thinking about it, and exploring the behaviours again this week, I'm
> more and more sure that the browser is a problematic place to do this work.
>  _Technically_, it's exactly the right place, of course, and the HTML5
> keygen element is v. clever.  But it's killing for users, and coming back
> to WebIDs and certificates this week, and parachuting into this discussion
> here, I've been a 'user' this week.
> >>
> >> A 'web browser' is a passive thing: it's a window through which you
> look at the web.  It quickly disappears, for all but the most hesitant and
> disoriented users; in particular it's not a thing which takes _actions_, or
> where you can store things.  That means that the browser creating the
> key-pair, and storing the server-generated certificate, is literally
> incomprehensible to the majority of anticipated users.
> >>
> >> And even to me.  I have an X.509 e-science certificate which needs
> renewing every year, and every year I stuff up this renewal in one way or
> another: the certificate isn't in the right place, or I try to retrieve the
> replacement with a different browser from the one which generated the CSR,
> or something else which is sufficiently annoying that I purge the
> experience from my memory.  And I understand about certificates and the
> whole PKI thing -- someone who doesn't is going to find the experience
> bamboozling, hateful and stressful.
> >>
> >> It sounds as if Hugh is going to generate his users' certificates
> off-line and distribute them; I got a little warm glow when I generated a
> WebID certificate (offline) using Keychain Access (KA), and then another
> using Nicolas Humfrey's script, and imported it into KA; when the UK
> e-science CA (above) started using a downloaded Java webstart application
> to do the renewal requests, it was massively easier on my head, even though
> the application itself wasn't going to win any design prizes.
> >>
> >> In each case, there was a 'thing' -- a 'certificate' -- which I can see
> on my desktop and then store securely in my 'keychain', and I can
> comprehend that I should think of it as a 'passport' or 'identity card',
> since that's a familiar thing which, like the WebID, is a proof of identity
> which might give me access to things on various grounds.
> >>
> >> I'm willing to be persuaded (presuming I'm not on OS X and willing to
> let KA look after this) that my browser has a 'keychain' and that I have to
> put this passport/id-card in there and leave it there.  I'm a bit
> uncomfortable with that, since I wouldn't want to leave my passport lying
> around where I can't see it, but if you tell me that's safe, I suppose I'll
> go along with that.
> >>
> >> The crucial thing here is that I can see this 'certificate' file
> sitting on my desktop, and I got that because someone gave it to me, or
> because I downloaded an application and pressed a button saying 'make me a
> WebID'.  I then _did something_ with that certificate file, so I have at
> least some vague sense that I've _stored_ that certificate somewhere, in a
> way that is subsequently proffered by my browser.
> >>
> >> I'm happy to have my certificate in a 'keychain', because that sounds
> like it's an application which is designed to keep things safe.  I think
> I'd still be unhappy keeping this 'in' my browser, because that feels like
> I'm storing my passport in a pocket attached to the glass of my window,
> which is obviously mad.
> >>
> >> I don't have an easy solution to this -- I can see all the problems
> with creating applications which users have to run to generate WebIDs, and
> regarding which they then have to be given follow-up instructions.  But
> doing this in the browser, though technically neat and correct, may have
> killing UI/model problems, as described above (because of the invisibility
> and passivity of the browser in most people's conception), and these
> problems may make this the browser-generation route less successful in the
> end.
> >>
> >> ----
> >>
> >> Codicil 1:
> >>
> >>>> In general, that brings up some thoughts for me, maybe here's the
> place to share them. It would be cool in browsers could bake the idea of a
> WebID into the persona/profile of the browser session. (ie. chromes
> profiles, and firefox has a profile plugin). Just allowing (by default, i
> guess) one WebID per persona. This way you are encouraged to manage
> different profiles at the browser level, rather than juggling a bunch of
> certificates with naming hacks to figure out which is which... ?
> >>> You can contribute your feedback as bug reports to the browsers.
> >>> A place to start is here:
> >>>
> http://www.w3.org/wiki/Foaf%2Bssl/Clients#Further_User_Interface_Issues
> >> Oooh, they're awful.  I just checked, and I submitted an Apple bug
> report about this -- detailing the awfulness and inadequacy of Safari's and
> Keychain Access's UIs here -- back in October 2008, which finally received
> "We are closing this bug since our engineers are aware of the issue and
> will continue to track it" in November 2011, and nothing since.  *sigh*
> >>
> >> Codicil 2:
> >>
> >>> Please let us know if you can think of improvements to the spec text,
> as we will be
> >>> publishing it soon.
> >> Something I just noticed: In section 2.1.2 of tls-respec.html, the
> language feels a little rough.  Can I offer:
> >>
> >> ...by using the HTML 5 keygen element.  This element can be placed in
> an HTML5 form, where it acts as follows: just before it submits the form,
> the browser asks the Key Store to create a public and private key pair, and
> when it receives the public part of the key from the store, it wraps this
> in a key request, as part of the form it sends to the Service. The Service
> can then create a WebID Certificate, and return this to the Client to pass
> back to the Key Store; the private key never leaves the secure Key Store.
> This exchange allows the Server to make the decision about what the
> Certificate should say, and what the WebID should be, since it is probably
> in the best place to do so. The user experience for this Certificate
> creation is a one click operation.
> >>
> >> ----
> >>
> >> I hope all this rambling is useful.
> >>
> >> Best wishes,
> >>
> >> Norman
> >>
> >>
> > +1
> >
> > In addition to the above, note that IE doesn't support <keygen/>. We had
> to make a .NET equivalent of a signed applet to create what (on the
> surface) looks like the normal <keygen/> flow.
> >
> > Having played around with many workflow scenarios over the years, we
> concluded that <keygen/> should simply be an option, but not the default.
> >
> > Hugh introduced a use-case that does actually reflect how many will be
> introduced to this concept i.e., the most tech savvy person in the friend
> network will generate WebID bearing certificates offline, and then
> distribute to other friends. The same thing will happen amongst family
> members -- something I've already experienced personally -- where the
>  following workflow steps provided a solution:
> >
> > 1. I took a photo of the kids
> > 2. I notified some family members about the photos -- via an email that
> includes pkcs#12 file attachments or download URLs
> > 3. I let them know that seeing the photos requires clicking on the
> pkcs#12 file -- so that they can use it as proof of identity when viewing
> the shared photos
> > 4. I shared the pkcs#12 password with them (phone, sms, separate email
> etc..)
> > 5. done.
> >
> > --
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Kingsley Idehen
> > Founder & CEO
> > OpenLink Software
> > Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com
> > Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
> > Twitter/Identi.ca handle: @kidehen
> > Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/112399767740508618350/about
> > LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>

Received on Friday, 9 August 2013 14:36:11 UTC