- From: Robin Wilton <wilton@isoc.org>
- Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2012 12:26:58 +0100
- To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
- Cc: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>, Halpin Harry <H.halplin@ed.ac.uk>, public-identity@w3.org, saag@ietf.org, "public-privacy@w3.org list" <public-privacy@w3.org>, public-webid@w3.org
- Message-Id: <E8AC244A-1D90-49F2-BD8A-2CF13E11D4B7@isoc.org>
Robin Wilton Technical Outreach Director - Identity and Privacy Internet Society email: wilton@isoc.org Phone: +44 705 005 2931 Twitter: @futureidentity On 24 Oct 2012, at 10:30, Ben Laurie wrote: > On 23 October 2012 10:58, Robin Wilton <wilton@isoc.org> wrote: >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2012, at 09:44, Ben Laurie wrote: >> >> <snip> >> >> >> Not disagreeing with any of the above, but observing that: >> >> a) There's no particular reason you could not have an email per site >> as well as a key per site. >> >> b) Linkability it not, as you say, inherently bad. The problem occurs >> when you have (effectively) no choice about linkability. >> >> >> >> But it's very hard to use either of those mechanisms (separation through >> emails or keys) without giving some third party the ability to achieve total >> linkability. (In other words, both options remove effective choice). > > I agree that emails are a problem, but not at all sure why keys are? > In the case of appropriate selective disclosure mechanisms, even if > there were a third party involved, they would not be able to link uses > of the keys. Also, if you insist on using linkable keys, then per-site > keys do not involve third parties. > It may just be that I'm not getting a clear mental picture of your architecture. But here was my thinking: - If you use symmetric keys, you get a system which can't scale unless you opt for Schneier's idea of a key server… but then the key server becomes a point of potential panopticality. - If you use PKI, *and* you want your communicating parties to be able to validate the certs they're relying on, then you have to design a CRL- or OCSP-like mechanism into the architecture, and again you end up with a component which is potentially panoptical. (Plus, you have to address the 20-year-old problem of how to make PKI usable by human beings, when recent history suggests that PKI only takes off where human beings are kept well away from it). R > On email, this is a soluble problem, but not without using a > completely different delivery mechanism. > >> >> Yrs., >> Robin >> >> _______________________________________________ >> saag mailing list >> saag@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag >>
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Received on Wednesday, 24 October 2012 11:30:53 UTC