Re: [saag] Liking Linkability

On 22 October 2012 10:42, Nathan <nathan@webr3.org> wrote:
> Kingsley Idehen wrote:
>>
>> On 10/21/12 3:52 PM, Nathan wrote:
>>>
>>> Kingsley Idehen wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 10/21/12 6:22 AM, Nathan wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Ben Laurie wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm getting quite tired of this: the point is, you cannot achieve
>>>>>> unlinkability with WebID except by using a different WebIDs. You made
>>>>>> the claim that ACLs on resources achieve unlinkability. This is
>>>>>> incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You're 100% correct here Ben, and I'm unsure why it's so hard to
>>>>> convey!?
>>>>>
>>>>> If you use the same identifier for more than one request, subsequent
>>>>> requests can be associated with the first request. An identifier here is any
>>>>> identifying, stable, information - key parts and URIs.
>>>>>
>>>>> If the issue is only unlinkability across sites, then you just have a
>>>>> keypair+uri per site. Or better, key-pair only, and that's associated with
>>>>> an identifier for the agent behind the interface.
>>>>>
>>>>> You're correct that ACLs won't cut it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Nathan,
>>>>
>>>> What is the subject of unlinkability ?
>>>>
>>>> I am sure you know that Henry and I are fundamentally referring to
>>>> nebulous real-world entities such as "You" and "I". A composite key of:
>>>> machine name, user agent name, and a document referrer links != said
>>>> neboulus entity. Even further away in today world of multiple form factor
>>>> devices that interact with the Internet and Web.
>>>>
>>>> There is no precise mechanism for electronically nailing down nebulous
>>>> entity "You" and "I". We aren't of the Internet or Web, so you can apprehend
>>>> us in person. At best you can speculate that we are the subjects of tokens
>>>> comprised of composite keys.
>>>>
>>>> Unlinkability is subject to context fluidity and temporality once you
>>>> add neboulus congnitive entites (not of the Web or Internet) to the
>>>> equation. I believe you know this anyway :-)
>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot say that a URI refers to "you" or "I" in one breathe, and say
>>> it doesn't (or may not) in another.
>>
>>
>> You raise a good point, Now let me clarify, I don't believe (unless in
>> utter error) that I've ever claimed that a URI definitively refers to "You",
>> "Me", or "I". Of course, I cannot claim to have not made the careless
>> utterances such as "Your Personal URI" , for instance.
>>
>> A URI that serves as a WebID has always been a denotation mechanism for a
>> composite key comprised of:
>>
>> 1. private key
>> 2. public key
>> 3. URI that resolves to a profile document that describes a subject via an
>> entity relationship graph.
>>
>> The subject of an X.509 certificate is a nebulous entity. This entity is
>> associated with attribute and value pairs that comprise the profile graph
>> imprinted in said certificate. The semantics of an X.509 certificate don't
>> change the nature of the certificates subject.
>>
>>>
>>> There is a use case which provides a technical requirement here, one
>>> which is simply to not use identifiable information between requests to
>>> different origin servers, and sometimes more granular, not using the same
>>> identifiable information between requests to the same server.
>>>
>>> WebID, just like any auth protocol can be used, it just means using it on
>>> a one time basis, or only for a particular origin.
>>
>>
>> WebID is a part of the picture, not the picture in its entirety. I've
>> pretty much tried to encourage others to be careful about conveying the
>> misconception that WebID (solely) resolves the issues at hand. It is just a
>> critical piece of the puzzle, that's it.
>>
>> You don't need to have a single WebID. Such a thing fails the most mundane
>> alter ego test re. 'Clarke Kent' and 'Superman' or 'Peter Parker' and
>> 'Spiderman'.
>>
>> Privacy is about the aforementioned personas not being comprised, under
>> any circumstances. The fact that DC world entities 'Clark Kent' and
>> 'Superman' used the same Web browser shouldn't comprise the alter ego
>> relationship between these personas.
>>
>> Unlinkability is about the alter ego paradox.
>>
>>>
>>> Personally I feel there are still questions here with WebID, as currently
>>> people use usernames/emails and passwords almost everywhere, and they can
>>> pick different usernames/emails/passwords on every site/origin. Suppose
>>> WebID was to gain 100% adoption overnight, we'd suddenly be in a position
>>> where everybody usually used the same identifier (rather than usernames and
>>> email addresses) and the same key (rather than multiple passwords) - because
>>> we've never been in a world like that, we don't know the consequences yet.
>>
>>
>> See my comments above. Such a system is dead on arrival re. privacy. There
>> have to be multiple WebIDs and the exploitation of logic when dealing with
>> data access policies, and all of this has to occur within specific
>> interaction contexts. For instance, if I want only you to see a document, I
>> could knock up the require security tokens and send them to you via a
>> PKCS#12 file. You open the file then go GET the document in question. Being
>> super paranoid, I would more than likely speak to you via phone about the
>> username and password combo for opening up the PKCS#12 file.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thus, when security and identity experts suggest that we need to handle
>>> unlinkability, or consider that we may often need per origin WebIDs (or even
>>> have that as the default mode), then we may be wise to say "okay", go away
>>> and find our options, then report them back for consideration and review.
>>>
>>> It by no means limits WebID, rather it just makes it applicable to a
>>> broader range of use cases.
>>
>>
>> We need others (note: expert is utterly subjective to me) interested in
>> these matters to be constructive rather than dismissive. I chime in most of
>> the time because I see Henry going to immense pains to explain matters only
>> to be summarily dismissed in manners that I find cognitively dissonant.
>>
>> A basic RDBMS product doesn't depend on single attribute/field primary
>> keys, why would such thinking even apply to the complex matter of privacy.
>> When I use the term composite, I am pretty much referring the the same
>> concept well understood in the RDBMS world. You can have a 'super key'
>> comprised of elements that are of themselves unique identifiers.
>>
>> I don't believe in a single WebID neither does Henry. We just believe that
>> Web-scale verifiable identity is a critical part of the required
>> infrastructure. We also believe that a de-referencable URI (e.g., an HTTP
>> URI) is a very powerful vehicle for this endeavor, even more so when
>> combined with structured data and first-order logic.
>>
>> I only know of one way to deal with context fluidity at the software
>> level, and that's via logic integrated into data which produces self
>> describing data objects .
>
>
> I agree on all counts and feel/think the same,

So do I, more or less (except the last sentence, which I don't think I
really understand, and if I do, seems too sweeping), which surprises
me.

> so I think I'll need to go
> and re-read this thread and see where the confusion is.

Possibly something to do with the fact that of all of Kingley's posts
so far this is the only one I haven't found either incomprehensible or
wrong.

Where we came in was me pointing out that if you disconnect your
identities by using multiple WebIDs, then you have a UI problem, and
since then the aim seems to have been to persuade us that multiple
WebIDs are not needed.

>
> Best, Nathan

Received on Monday, 22 October 2012 09:55:07 UTC