Re: The "korean bank" use-case

On 28 Nov 2011, at 14:45, Mo McRoberts wrote:

> Now, there might — presumably — be some variation on the theme where the HSM contains a private key whose public key is known to the relaying party, and *that* key is used to sign the newly-generated keys, allowing positive confirmation that the key was indeed generated on the HSM (because it won't sign keys which haven't been) — but I honestly don't know if any HSMs do this or not?

where I said “relaying party” I do, of course, mean “relying party”!

Mo McRoberts - Technical Lead - The Space,
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Received on Monday, 28 November 2011 14:49:06 UTC